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Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for 
LGBT Plaintiffs 
Anita L. Allen† 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, both constitutional law and tort law recognize the 
right to privacy, understood as legal entitlement to an intimate life of one’s own 
free from undue interference by others and the state.1 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (“LGBT”) persons have defended their interests in dignity, 
equality, autonomy, and intimate relationships in the courts by appealing to that 
right.  
In the constitutional arena, LGBT Americans have claimed the protection 
of state and federal privacy rights with a modicum of well-known success.2 
 
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of 
their publications 
† Anita L. Allen, J.D., Ph.D., Henry R. Silverman, Professor of Law and  Professor of 
Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Mr. Erez Aloni, LLM., for 
invaluable research assistance. 
1. The right to privacy is also recognized by federal statutes. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). See generally Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law and Society 
(2007) (textbook of common law, constitutional, and statutory privacy and data protection law, 
including chapters that focus on federal internet, communications and surveillance statutes). 
Federal statutes whose bare titles do not suggest privacy protection nonetheless function to create 
medical, financial, and other privacy rights federal agencies are empowered to enforce. Implicated 
in a recent controversy concerning LGBT youth, the Federal Trade Commission Act is an apt 
example. In a July 1, 2010 letter, David Vladek, Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, warned that plans pursuant to a bankruptcy proceeding to sell 
personal information of defunct XY Magazine subscribers and XY.com site users (as an asset 
belonging to magazine and site founder Peter Ian Cummings) could violate the Federal Trade 
Commission Act’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” See Letter from 
David C. Vladek, Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer Prot., U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Peter Larson 
& Martin E. Shmagin (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/100712xy.pdf. 
XY.com had expressly promised privacy and anonymity to its site users, most of whom were 
teenagers interested in gay lifestyles and issues. Id. Mr. Vladek requested that “to avoid the 
possibility that this highly sensitive data” revealing the sexual orientation of young men and teens 
“fall into the wrong hands,” the data “ be destroyed (along with any credit card data still being 
retained) as soon as possible.” Id. 
2. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down laws criminalizing 
consensual sexual acts between same-sex adults); see also Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing right to same-sex marriage in Commonwealth of 
allenCLRfinalNoPagination.doc (Do Not Delete) 12/1/2010  4:33 PM 
102 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  XX:nnn 
Holding that homosexuals have the same right to sexual privacy as 
heterosexuals, Lawrence v. Texas symbolizes the possibility of victory in the 
courts for LGBT Americans seeking privacy in intimate life. “Liberty,” wrote 
Justice Anthony Kennedy in Lawrence, “presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”3 
In another important decision, Goodridge v. Massachusetts Department of 
Public Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that state 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage lacked a rational basis and violated the state 
constitution’s affirmation of “the dignity and equality of all individuals,” with a 
concurring justice explaining that the “right to marry is not a privilege 
conferred by the State, but a fundamental right that is protected against 
unwarranted State interference.”4  
In the U.S. tort arena, as in the state and federal constitutional arenas, 
LGBT plaintiffs have claimed violations of their privacy rights and have 
sometimes won.5 In common law privacy tort cases, the defendants charged 
with privacy violations typically have included private-sector employers,6 the 
professional media,7 retailers,8 or private individuals.9 As detailed throughout 
this Article, LGBT plaintiffs have accused such defendants of prying, spying, 
insulting or harassing them, or disclosing their birth sex, sexual orientation, or 
medical information without authorization. Lawsuits have framed the violations 
experienced by LGBT claimants as one or more of the four privacy torts Dean 
William L. Prosser distinguished10 and subsequently enshrined in the American 
Law Institute’s Second Restatement of Torts.11 Several authors have argued 
 
Massachusetts).  
 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 4. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 948. 
 5. See, e.g., Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000) (lesbian 
businesswoman alleging locals invaded her common law privacy rights, inflicted emotional 
distress, and defamed her in concerted campaign to oust her and her partner from Christmas 
Valley community).  
 6. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1995) (whether law firm invaded a gay employee’s privacy by disclosing his sexual 
orientation within the firm after he named his male partner as his pension beneficiary was a 
question of fact for a trial court). 
 7. See, e.g., Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 
2002) (gay lifestyle magazine not liable for invasion of privacy for having acquired and published 
photographs of partly closeted gay model without his consent). 
 8. See, e.g., Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (plaintiff 
not entitled to recover for privacy invasion where retail store employees called police after 
peeping through a ceiling crack to view him in a toilet stall where he was allegedly engaging in 
“sodomy”). 
 9. See, e.g., Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Miss. 1999) (lesbian plaintiff not 
entitled to recover for privacy invasion after lover’s ex-husband spied on her, photographed her 
partially nude in her bedroom, and then distributed photographs to gain advantage in a child 
custody dispute). 
10. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 423 (1960).  
11. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that the right of privacy is invaded by “(a) 
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another . . . or (b)appropriation of the other’s name 
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that the invasion of privacy torts, especially Prosser’s “unreasonable publicity 
given to the other’s private life,” are potentially useful remedies for LGBT 
plaintiffs.12 But LGBT plaintiffs relying on Prosser’s common law tort 
remedies have not been as successful as some would have predicted based on a 
general understanding of the torts and their superficial appeal. The common 
law of torts has yet to generate its Goodridge or Lawrence.  
In this Article I analyze about three dozen cases, mostly published 
appellate cases, in which LGBT plaintiffs have alleged one or more of 
Prosser’s four common law privacy tort offenses on facts that expressly involve 
their sexual orientations or gender identities.13 The aims of my analysis are 
twofold. 
First, I wish to contribute to the understanding of the legacy of Prosser’s 
four-fold taxonomy of privacy tort claims—intrusion, appropriation, 
publication of private fact, and false light publication. As noted, the taxonomy 
appeared in Prosser’s 1960 article.14 Serving as its lead reporter, Prosser later 
incorporated his taxonomy into the Restatement (Second) of Torts.15 I argue 
 
or likeness . . . ; or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life . . . ; or (d) publicity 
that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public . . . .” Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652A(2) (1977). 
12. See, e.g., Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? 
The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation, 11 Cardozo Arts 
& Ent. L.J. 857, 896–98 (1993) (the private facts tort should be available as remedy for 
persons whose sexual orientation is exposed without consent by others seeking to combat AIDS, 
identify secret homosexuals, or provide homosexual role models); Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, 
Privacy, and the Changing Social Status of Homosexuality: Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay 
Rights Jurisprudence, 12 Tul J.L. & Sexuality 119, 127 (2003) (the private facts tort 
offers a potential “route to recovery for the individual who is accused of or revealed as being a 
homosexual”); cf. Keith J. Hilzendeger, Comment, Unreasonable Publicity: How Well Does Tort 
Law Protect the Unwarranted Disclosure of a Person’s HIV-Positive Status?, 35 Ariz. St. 
L.J. 187, 188 (2003) (courts should offer broader protection to plaintiffs suing under privacy 
facts torts than the Restatement of Torts currently calls for); Ronald F. Wick, Out of the Closet and 
Into the Headlines: “Outing” and the Private Facts Tort, 80 Geo. L.J. 413, 427 (1991) 
(same). 
13. For this Article, I attempted to gather all of the reported privacy tort cases to date in 
which plaintiffs self-identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transsexual or transgender. (In the 
attempt I uncovered a number of pending and unpublished LGBT-plaintiff privacy tort cases, 
along with cases in which persons have sued under privacy tort theories for misattribution of 
gender-nonconforming traits, see Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944), homosexuality or 
being transgender. I have incorporated all of these interesting cases into the Article.) Extrapolating 
from my findings and the empirical results reported by William McLauchlan, see William 
McLauchlan, Why People Litigate: An Examination of Privacy Tort Cases (Apr. 3, 2008) (paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Sci. Ass’n Annual Nat’l Conference, 
Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL), available at http://www.allacademic.com/ 
meta/p266091_index.html, I estimate that reported appellate cases brought by LGBT persons 
alleging LGBT-related offenses probably account for no more than 3 percent of the total number 
of appellate privacy cases decided since 1906. Mclaughlan offers 350 as the total number of 
appellate privacy tort cases decided in forty-seven states between 1906 and the year 2000. Id. at 
27.  
14. Prosser, supra note 10. 
15. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2) (1977). 
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that although most courts adopting the Restatement have not questioned the 
accuracy of Prosser’s distinctive formal taxonomy,16 plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
LGBT issues-related cases implicitly challenge the taxonomy by alleging that a 
single encounter with defendants resulted in violations encompassing two, 
three, or all four of Prosser’s invasion of privacy torts. I conclude that the 
frequent practice of characterizing a single privacy invasion as an instance of 
multiple privacy torts calls into question the integrity of Prosser’s framework of 
formal categories. Although I do not claim that LGBT issues-related cases 
strain Prosser’s taxonomy any more than other privacy tort cases, I do believe 
this body of cases exposes the limitations of Prosser’s distinctions on 
particularly poignant and compelling facts.  
Second, I wish to assess the efficacy of existing privacy tort remedies for 
persons alleging wrongs tied to sexual orientation and gender identity. In this 
regard, I maintain that the theoretically promising invasion of privacy torts 
have too often been practical disappointments for LGBT plaintiffs in the 
courts.17 To provide real, consistent remedies for LGBT plaintiffs, courts must 
refashion their understandings of how critical elements of privacy torts can be 
met and withstand defenses.  
The post-1960 cases tentatively support three main conclusions about the 
efficacy of privacy tort remedies. First, in the past half century, the invasion of 
privacy tort has not been especially useful to LGBT plaintiffs seeking monetary 
and injunctive relief in cases related to their sexual orientations or identities. 
Second, as applied, the invasion of privacy tort has not reliably vindicated the 
complex interest LGBT plaintiffs understandably assert in what I term 
“selective disclosure” of their sexual orientations or identities. Third, recent 
success in the LGBT population’s historic quest for equality and inclusion 
potentially undercuts the already tenuous practical utility of the invasion of 
privacy tort. Courts may fail to discern that sexual orientation and sexual 
identity-related privacy protection is warranted for LGBT individuals if, on the 
societal level, there has been a significant reduction in violence, social stigma, 
and discrimination associated with open LGBT status. Wins in Lawrence and 
Goodridge signal such a reduction, as does pending legislation to abolish the 
 
16. Even the courts that have rejected the false light tort or the private fact tort have not 
done so on the ground that the taxonomy itself is flawed. See generally James B. Lake, 
Restraining False Light: Constitutional and Common Law Limits on a “Troublesome Tort”, 61 
Fed. Comm. L.J. 625, 639–48 (2009) (stating courts reject false light tort because they 
believe it overlaps the defamation tort and the publication of private fact tort because they believe 
it impairs freedom of speech). 
17. Cf. Hilary E. Ware, Note, Celebrity Privacy Rights and Free Speech: Recalibrating 
Tort Remedies for “Outed” Celebrities, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 449, 468, 488 
(1997) (arguing that privacy torts are “unpromising” remedies against unwanted disclosure of 
homosexuality and need to be “reconceptualiz[ed]”). My broader contention is that the torts are 
unpromising remedies against not only unwanted disclosure, but also against unwanted intrusion, 
false light publicity, and appropriation. 
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nation’s policy against homosexuals in the military.18  
Part I briefly recites the history and background of the invasion of privacy 
tort, an indispensable highlight of which is the seminal 1890 Harvard Law 
Review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. I then organize my 
substantive analysis to mirror the structure of Prosser’s classic 1960 article. 
Prosser’s article devoted separate sections to each of the four torts comprising 
his descriptive taxonomy of privacy claims. Part II examines LGBT plaintiffs’ 
“intrusion” claims. I group plaintiffs’ intrusion claims into subcategories 
Prosser did not identify, and suggest why even seemingly strong intrusion 
claims brought by LGBT parties have failed. Part III examines LGBT 
plaintiffs’ “public disclosure of private facts” claims. I explain why courts are 
unreceptive to the notion that a person should be legally entitled to disclose 
selectively—that is, disclose in some contexts to some persons but not others—
sexual orientation, same-sex relationships, and birth sex. Part IV assesses false 
light publication claims by LGBT plaintiffs and persons inaccurately depicted 
as such. Plaintiffs alleging they are not LGBT, but that they have been publicly 
described as such, appear to have an easier time with the false light tort than 
plaintiffs who are LGBT alleging that their lives and identities have been 
wrongfully distorted due to prejudice and intolerance. Part V examines LGBT 
plaintiffs’ commercial appropriation claims, and the doctrinal reasons they 
generally fail, unrelated to sexual orientation, gender, or birth sex. Tort 
doctrines afford remarkable freedom to those who make unauthorized use of 
photographs in “newsworthy” and other publications. The case law illustrates 
that implications of this doctrinal latitude are especially serious for LGBT 
people.  
After defending his descriptive taxonomy, Prosser devoted the final 
sections of his article to “common features,”19 “public figures and public 
interest,”20 “limitations,”21 and “defenses.”22 These sections reflected 
skepticism about the privacy tort and revealed concerns that unbridled 
expansion of the privacy torts could interfere with First Amendment freedoms 
of speech and press and crowd the proper domains of the defamation and 
infliction of emotional distress torts. Responding with hindsight to some of 
these jurisprudential concerns, Part VI notes judicial observations about the 
 
18. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, H.R.5136, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (received and read twice in Senate, June 28, 2010); see also Log Cabin Republicans v. 
United States, No. CV 04-08425-VAP EX, 2010 WL 3960791 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2010) (holding 
DADT unconstitutional and issuing an injunction to stop the enforcement of the policy); accord, 
Witt v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, No. 06-5195RBL, 2010 WL 3732189 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 
2010) (holding that the application of DADT violated the plaintiff’s due process rights, and 
ordering to restore her military service).     
19. Prosser, supra note 10, at 407. 
20. Id. at 410. 
21. Id. at 415. 
22. Id. at 419. 
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interplay and possible redundancy of privacy invasion and defamation 
remedies. Rounding out my account of the experience of LGBT privacy 
plaintiffs, I conclude with an assessment of the fate of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims brought alongside LGBT plaintiffs’ privacy claims.  
I 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVACY TORT 
The privacy tort is a modern cause of action that has been recognized in 
most states.23 The concept of a common law right to privacy took flight in 
1890. The prominent lawyer and affluent businessman Samuel D. Warren was 
unhappy about attention the press paid to his lavish social life.24 Warren 
pressured his reluctant friend and law partner Louis D. Brandeis into 
coauthoring a law review article urging recognition of an invasion of privacy 
tort.25 The tort would deter and redress publication in newspapers of gossip and 
photographs that “invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life” 
and thereby injured “inviolate personality.”26 A rhetorical tour de force, the 
article inspired the judiciary. Courts soon began citing the article with approval, 
eventually expanding the understanding of the kinds of litigable privacy wrongs 
to include violations of modesty and genteel refinement.27 In 1906, relying on 
 
23. The first use of the word “privacy” in a state court case may have been in State v. 
Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829), where the court declined to consider punishment for battery 
against a slave “by reasons of its privacy”—a privacy which permits the master to exact “bloody 
vengeance” in response to unruly disloyalty. Id. at 267; see also Frederick S. Lane, 
American Privacy: The 400-Year History of Our Most Contested 
Right 59 (2009). The term cropped up again in 1830 and 1868 in the voices of judges 
describing the proper realm of women (privacy life) and the rationale for the authority of husbands 
to physically discipline their spouses (domestic privacy). Id. at 60. The state of Washington in 
1889 became the first to “explicitly codify a right to privacy in its state constitution: ‘No person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.’” Id. 
(citation omitted). 
24. See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life 46–
104 (2009). In his influential article on privacy, Dean Prosser stated that the invasion of privacy 
tort was “a most marvelous tree to grow from the wedding of the daughter of Mr. Samuel D. 
Warren.” Prosser, supra note 10, at 423. But it is doubtful that Warren had a daughter of 
marriageable age in 1890, a mere seven years after his own marriage. Warren married his wife 
Mabel Bayard in 1883, a wedding from which the bride banned the groom’s best friend, Louis D. 
Brandeis, because he was Jewish. See Urofsky, supra note 24, at 97. 
25. Urofsky, supra note 24, at 98 (“Naturally the penny press of the era wanted to report 
on the doings of [Warren’s circle of family and friends] . . . men and women who seemed to party 
constantly, had homes in the city and the country, rode to the hounds, sailed, and had money to 
support such a lifestyle. For reasons not altogether clear, at some point Sam began to resent what 
he saw as press intrusion into his private life, and turned to Louis. Brandeis did not really want to 
get involved (he said he would have preferred to write on the duty of publicity than on the right to 
privacy) but, at his friend’s importuning, agreed to look into the issue.”). 
26. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 
193, 195, 205 (1890). 
27. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891) (holding that a 
female plaintiff could not be forced to undergo a medical examination and thereby “lay bare the 
body,” citing “[t]he inviolability of the person” and the right “to be let alone,” and thus echoing 
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natural law to bypass the limitations of positive law that kept New York’s 
Court of Appeals from recognizing a privacy right in a famous 1902 decision,28 
the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first state high court to allow a 
plaintiff to sue under the privacy tort theory.29 According to the unanimous 
opinion by Justice Cobb, “The right of privacy has its foundation in the 
instincts of nature.”30 The victim of a privacy invasion is “in reality a slave, 
without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master.”31 Other courts 
followed Georgia’s lead, and tort actions premised on invasion of privacy soon 
proliferated.32 
A. Prosser’s Influential Taxonomy 
Prosser’s historic 1960 article assessing the proliferation of privacy tort 
actions had a major impact on subsequent scholarly understanding of the early 
history of the invasion of privacy tort. Moreover, Prosser’s descriptive 
taxonomy of a half century of cases would govern the subsequent doctrinal 
development of the invasion of privacy tort in the courts.  
Prosser framed his article as an original analysis of about three hundred 
published court opinions in privacy-related tort cases.33 Prosser’s thesis was 
that the invasion of privacy tort, then recognized by what he called an 
 
Warren and Brandeis); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (family of 
deceased women could block the erection of a bust in her honor, on the ground that she was not a 
“public character” but “a woman of great refinement and cultivation” who preferred privacy and 
had a right to it). 
28. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902) (holding 
that the right to privacy tort had not yet been adopted and therefore could not provide a remedy for 
a woman whose photograph had been used on packaging for baking flour without her consent). 
29. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80–81 (Ga. 1905) (“So thoroughly 
satisfied are we that the law recognizes within proper limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy, 
and that the publication of one’s picture without his consent by another as an advertisement, for 
the mere purpose of increasing the profits and gains of the advertiser, is an invasion of this right, 
that we venture to predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary 
view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability . . . .”).  
30. Id. at 69. 
31. Id. at 80. 
32. In his 1960 article, Prosser comprehensively cited and sorted the cases spawned by 
Pavesich, notable examples of which are Sidis v. F-R Publishing, 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) 
(New York not liable for publishing unflattering story about former child prodigy); Melvin v. 
Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (privacy of ex-prostitute and acquitted murder defendant 
invaded by unauthorized film about her life); and Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) 
(memoir writer liable to woman repelled by portrayal of her as a woman with masculine virtues). 
See also McLauchlan, supra note 13. According to McLauchlan, about ten privacy tort cases 
are decided each year on appeal in the United States (excluding, Alaska, Hawaii and Utah) and 
there have been a total of about 350 such cases through the year 2000, most losses for their 
plaintiffs. Id. at 25, 27 fig.1. He places the odds of winning a privacy appeal as no better than 
three to one. Id. at 28 fig.2. He speculates that people litigate privacy wrongs due to an emotional 
attachment to their claims. Id. at 25.  
33. Prosser, supra note 10, at 388. 
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“overwhelming” majority of state courts, was in reality four distinct torts.34 
Prosser labeled them: (1) intrusion; (2) public disclosure of private fact; (3) 
false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation.35 To defend his thesis, 
Prosser cited numerous cases illustrating each of the four categories of his four-
part taxonomy.36  
Prosser did not stop with a bare taxonomy. He also outlined the critical 
elements of proof courts required for each of the four torts. For example, 
Prosser observed that proof of conduct “which would be offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable man” was required in the case of intrusion;37 and 
proof of publication or broadcast to more than a few persons was required in 
the case of public disclosure.38 In addition, Prosser ventured to characterize the 
different interests at stake in the recognition of each tort. He associated mental 
repose with intrusion, good reputation with false light in the public eye, and 
property with appropriation.39 Prosser further noted common features of the 
torts, such as the “personal” nature of the rights conferred 40 and the availability 
of typical tort damages.41 Recognizing a “head-on collision with the 
constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press,”42 Prosser argued that liability 
and recovery in invasion of privacy cases were significantly affected by the 
plaintiffs’ celebrity or public office and the news interest in the plaintiffs’ 
lives.43 Finally, Prosser identified common defenses to invasion of privacy 
claims, starting with consent.44  
In the conclusion to his article, Prosser distilled an array of skeptical 
concerns about the privacy tort. It troubled him, first, that the courts had created 
so complex a series of four torts from the “use of a single word”45 in the 
Warren and Brandeis article; second, that the right’s existence narrows the 
constitutional freedoms of speech and press; and, third, that privacy actions 
crowd the established territory of other, more limited tort actions—chiefly, 
 
34. Id. at 386.  
35. Id. at 389. 
36. Though it would become the most influential, the 1960 article was not the first to 
introduce Prosser’s taxonomy. Prosser may have debuted it in articles written in the mid-1930s. 
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 Calif. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010). Suggestive of his influence even before 1960, the taxonomy 
appears, minus the false light tort, in the 1956 case Housh v. Peth, in which the state of Ohio first 
recognized the right to privacy. Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ohio 1956). There the court 
distinguished three causes of action: (1) “the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one’s 
personality”; (2) “the publicizing of one’s private affairs with which the public has no legitimate 
concern”; and (3) wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities.” Id. at 341. 
37. Prosser, supra note 10, at 391. 
38. Id. at 393–94.  
39. Id. at 392. 
40. Id. at 408. 
41. Id. at 408–09. 
42. Id. at 410. 
43. Id. at 410–15. 
44. Id. at 419. 
45. Id. at 422. 
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infliction of emotional distress and defamation.46 He was also troubled that the 
privacy torts were unbounded enough to encourage suits over trivialities or 
intrusions brought on oneself: “a lady who insists upon sun-bathing in the nude 
in her own back yard” invites “neighbors [to] examine her with appreciation 
and binoculars.”47  
As Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Prosser enshrined his descriptive taxonomy as positive law.48 The same 
four invasion of privacy torts Prosser identified in the 1960 article were 
included in the Restatement. Through the Restatement, Prosser may have 
achieved the ultimate aim of his landmark 1960 article: he made it more likely 
the bar and bench would “realize what we are doing, and give some 
consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.”49 In 
the fifty years since Prosser’s article, additional state high courts have 
embraced the invasion of privacy tort. A few, however, have heeded Prosser’s 
cautions and declined to embrace privacy actions premised on publication of 
private facts or false light, citing First Amendment limitations,50 or citing the 
adequacy of remedies in defamation and other torts. 51 
B. LGBT Issues in Privacy Tort Litigation 
Prosser has been described as “anti-gay.”52 Yet there is nothing in 
principle “anti-gay” about the privacy torts he helped mold. Indeed, relying on 
the promise of the Prosser’s four privacy torts, LGBT claimants and their 
attorneys have sought monetary and injunctive relief. As the cases I discuss 
here will reveal, LGBT plaintiffs have brought privacy claims because they 
were spied on, insulted, disparaged, and whispered about. They have alleged 
that the tortious publication of their sexual orientation has destroyed their jobs, 
professions, businesses, families, and intimate personal relationships. The 
proliferation of public lawsuits exposing the private lives of LGBT individuals 
has illuminated the unfortunate reality that members of the LGBT community 
 
46. Id.  
47. Id. A real life version of this scenario unfolded in 2002 when television celebrity 
Jennifer Anniston sued and eventually settled with various media defendants who published 
photographs of her sunbathing at her home with her breasts exposed. The photographs were taken 
by professional paparazzi. See Anniston Snaps Case ‘Is Settled’, Birmingham Post, July 4, 
2002, at 9. 
48. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A(2) (1977).  
49. Prosser, supra note 10, at 423. 
50. See e.g., Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting public disclosure of 
private facts tort on constitutional free speech grounds). 
51. See e.g., Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P. 3d 893 (Colo. 2002); Lake v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994) (all 
rejecting the false light tort as duplicative of the older defamation tort). 
52. Professor Stephen Sugarman, Opening Remarks at the California Law Review 
Symposium: Prosser’s Privacy at 50 (Jan. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.californialawreview.org/information/prosser-info. 
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do not fully benefit in everyday life from the rules of “deference and 
demeanor” that otherwise govern civil relationships.53  
For example, common private places are not reliably private for the LGBT 
community. Neither a restroom stall54 nor a bedroom55 is free from intrusion. 
Members of a society that once told gays and lesbians to closet themselves 
have, in effect, crept into the closet with them to peep at and punish what goes 
on inside.56 Straight husbands and wives have publicized their gay, lesbian, or 
bisexual spouses’ sexual orientation,57 sometimes hoping to prevail in a child 
custody battle.58 Even more unfortunate, the cases surveyed in this Article 
reveal that the history of the privacy tort is not a simple “us versus them” story. 
The LGBT community has invaded the privacy of its own members. For 
instance, in 2002 a gay model sued a well-meaning gay lifestyles magazine for 
using his photographs to illustrate a story about the dangers of unprotected sex 
and excessive drug use in a narrow segment of gay culture to which the model 
did not belong.59 In 1997, a closeted gay man sued his vindictive ex-lover who 
had revealed his sexual orientation to his employer, mother and neighbors.60  
In Parts II–V below, I examine privacy tort suits brought by LGBT 
plaintiffs (and by persons accurately or inaccurately characterized as LGBT by 
others). These plaintiffs have been willing to bring lawsuits, knowing that 
 
53. Erving Goffman The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 Am. 
Anthropologist 473, 475–99 (1956). According to Goffman,  
In all societies rules of conduct tend to be organized into codes which guarantee that 
everyone acts appropriately and receives his due. In our society the code which governs 
substantive rules and substantive expressions comprises our law, morality, and ethics, 
while the code which governs ceremonial rules and ceremonial expressions is 
incorporated in what we call etiquette.  
Id. at 476–77.  
Nor do persons perceived as belonging to the LGBT population get the benefits of civility. 
See Complaint for Libel, False Light, Intentional Interference with Business Relations, Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Injunctive Relief, Thompson v. Doe, No. 2010CV183037 
(Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Complaint for Thompson] (Atlanta adult entertainment 
dancer “Nairobi” sued rapper/comedian whose derogatory Twitter message suggested she was a 
man in drag). 
54. See Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). 
55. See Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Miss. 1999) (lesbian photographed 
partially nude by lover’s peeping Tom ex-husband). 
56. See Elmore, 341 S.E.2d 905. 
57. Ex-husbands have also uncloseted ex-wives. See, e.g., Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. 
Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that school district’s restrictions on lesbian teacher’s 
right to express her sexual orientation outside the classroom impermissibly infringed teacher’s 
First Amendment rights in case where school teacher’s ex-husband revealed her lesbian sexual 
orientation to others); see also Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 
App. 2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor of television station on First Amendment 
ground that the publication of private fact was of “legitimate public concern” in case where gay 
HIV positive father and police officer in custody battle with ex-wife who revealed his status to 
media). 
58. See Plaxico, 735 So. 2d 1036.  
59. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002). 
60. Doe v. S.B.M., 488 S.E.2d 878, 880 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). 
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litigation would render hidden details of their personal lives more public. Like 
most privacy tort plaintiffs, LGBT plaintiffs ironically suffer publicity in order 
to use the tort system to remedy perceived invasions of their privacy. 
Occasionally, privacy plaintiffs manage to sue anonymously,61 but most file 
publicly available lawsuits under their own names alleging one or more of 
Prosser’s four torts: intrusion, publication of private fact, false light, and 
appropriation. I begin with LGBT intrusion cases.  
II 
INTRUSION  
“Intrusion” is the name Prosser gave to the first of the four invasion of 
privacy torts discussed in his 1960 article.62 “It appears obvious,” Prosser 
wrote, “that the interest protected by this branch of the tort is primarily a 
mental one.”63 The intrusion tort has arisen, he stated vaguely, “chiefly to fill in 
the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, the intentional infliction of mental distress, 
and whatever remedies there may be for the invasion of constitutional rights.”64 
According to Prosser, physical trespass into private domains is the paradigm of 
intrusion, but non-trespassory wiretapping and harassing debt-collection phone 
calls can be privacy intrusions too.65 Prosser pointed out that courts had found 
attempts to access private documents, such as bank records or work papers, to 
constitute intrusion.66 But Prosser detected reluctance on the part of the courts 
to view either noise nuisances or insulting words and gestures as intrusions.67 
Moreover, “[o]n the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has 
no right to be alone.”68 It is “clear that the intrusion must be something which 
would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man.”69  
This Part examines these aspects of the intrusion tort, and concludes that, 
in operation, the tort has proven to be an unreliable remedy for LGBT 
plaintiffs. This Part also identifies what I describe as four different categories 
or types of intrusion offenses that LGBT intrusion tort plaintiffs have alleged: 
 
61. See, e.g., Doe v. Templeton, No. 03 C 5076, 2004 WL 1882436 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 
2004) (lesbian plaintiff tricked into being photographed with imposter posing as famous 
skateboarder Tony Hawk sued for publication of photograph with caption she believed revealed to 
others her sexual orientation for the first time). 
62. See Prosser, supra note 10, at 389. The rule is stated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts as “[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion 
of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652B (1977). 
63. Prosser, supra note 10, at 392.  
64. Id. at 392.  
65. Id. at 389–90. 
66. Id. at 390.  
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 391. 
69. Id. at 390–91. 
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(1) physical intrusion and surveillance; (2) verbal intrusion and prying; (3) 
verbal insult and disparagement; and (4) intrusive publication of private fact. 
Non-LGBT plaintiffs could theoretically experience—and have in fact 
experienced—all four categories of intrusion offenses. But the facts behind the 
case law suggest that an LGBT sexual orientation or identity can provoke 
especially thoughtless and egregious intrusion offenses, reflective of a social 
context of prejudice, homophobia, and discrimination. 
A. Intrusion: Physical Intrusion and Surveillance 
Given its surface potential, the intrusion tort has been surprisingly 
unhelpful to several LGBT plaintiffs in the years since Prosser’s 1960 article 
defined its parameters. In cases of physical intrusion and surveillance of LGBT 
persons, courts have all too often deemed the defendants’ conduct reasonable.  
In Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc.,70 the plaintiff-appellant unsuccessfully 
appealed a summary judgment order entered on behalf of a retail store at which 
he was arrested and charged with sodomy. Following a customer’s complaint 
that homosexual activity was taking place in a restroom, store employees 
peeked through a crack in the restroom ceiling and observed Mr. Elmore in a 
toilet stall.71 Elmore filed a complaint for intrusion upon seclusion alleging that 
the defendants spied on him “in a private place.”72 Plaintiff-appellant Elmore 
argued that private citizens do not have the right to spy and should leave law 
enforcement surveillance to the police.73 Elmore also denied that he was 
engaged in sodomy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
retail defendants; the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed.74  
The Court of Appeals found that “[a]n individual clearly has an interest in 
privacy within a toilet stall.”75 However, the court found the defendants’ 
intrusion reasonable—not highly offensive to a reasonable person as the tort 
requires. The right to privacy in a public restroom stall is not absolute, the court 
stressed.76 The restroom in question was for the use of customers, and the 
defendant had a duty to keep its restrooms free of crime.77 Moreover, the 
spying activity was ignited by the store’s loss-prevention manager’s 
observation and complaint of “highly suspicious”78 activity in the restroom.  
 
70. 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). 
71. Id.  
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 906.  
74. Id. at 907.  
75. Id. at 906.  
76. Id. (citing Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1906)); see also 
Anita L. Allen, Driven Into Society: Philosophies of Surveillance Take to the Streets of New York, 
Amsterdam L. F. (2009), available at ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/download/92/157 (noting 
that there is a privacy interest in conduct in public places that has limits and is not absolute). 
77. Elmore, 341 S.E.2d at 906.  
78. Id. at 905. 
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Although a typical restroom open to the general public of all ages in a 
department store is not an appropriate place for sexual activity, the conduct of 
the defendants was reprehensible. Measures to abate sexual activity in toilet 
stalls do not have to include peeping at individuals through concealed openings. 
The defendant employees easily could have investigated their suspicions of 
merchandise theft or of sexual activity in a way that respected the privacy and 
dignity of persons inside the stall. If suspicious activity seemed to be occurring, 
for instance, they might have knocked on the door of the stall and asked anyone 
inside to come out. Instead, they engaged in surreptitious peeping, which, on 
these facts, a reasonable person could view as intrusion.  
Carlos Ball has argued, with respect to the Supreme Court, that “the 
Court’s geographization of sexual liberty has resulted in the protection of 
sexual conduct that takes place in the home (and, presumably, in analogous 
sites such as hotel rooms) while leaving unprotected sexual conduct that occurs 
in public sites” such as restrooms.79 However, gays, lesbians and bisexuals 
have a problem whether sexual liberty is formally “geographized” or not. The 
geographization of sexual liberty alone cannot ensure adequate legal protection 
for the compliant LGBT population that discretely limits sex to approved 
domestic and similar sites. The holding of Lawrence v. Texas leaves lower 
courts free to refuse the protection of the intrusion tort to lovers who are 
members of the same sex even when their consensual adult sexual activity has 
occurred in a private bedroom.80 
Plaxico v. Michael illustrates that the private home is not a sanctuary for 
intimate sex for LGBT individuals where courts view homosexual relationships 
as illicit.81 Glenn Michael was divorced, and his ex-wife had custody of their 
six-year-old daughter.82 Michael learned his ex-wife was involved in a lesbian 
relationship with Rita Plaxico.83 Michael drove to his ex-wife’s cabin, crept up 
to a window, peered inside, and watched the couple having sex.84 He returned 
to his vehicle, retrieved a camera, and photographed Plaxico half-naked on the 
bed.85 Michael then filed for a modification of child custody, using the 
surreptitiously snapped photos of Plaxico during the trial.86 The court granted 
 
79. Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public Sex, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 
1, 4 (2008). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965), indeed tie sexual privacy to the bedroom. But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) (holding that a man engaged in illegal activities in a phone booth on a public street has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes).  
80. Lawrence struck down criminal prohibitions on gay sex. It does not dictate that private 
intrusions into the bedrooms of gay persons must be ruled “highly offensive to a reasonable 
person” in state court tort actions. Restatement (Second) Torts § 652B (1977). 
81. 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999). 
82. Id. at 1038.  
83. Id.  
84. Id.  
85. Id.  
86. Id.  
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him custody of his minor child.87 Subsequently Plaxico filed suit for intrusion 
upon seclusion and solitude.88 The Circuit Court of Tippah County rejected the 
suit, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed.89  
Like the plaintiff in Elmore, Plaxico lost because the court found secret, 
illegal surveillance of suspected homosexual activity justified due to the 
suspected activity’s illicit and possibly illegal character.90 The majority held 
that Plaxico failed to prove that Michael’s actions were “highly offensive to the 
ordinary person.”91 Although he spied and photographed sexual intimacies, he 
was prompted to do so to protect his daughter from exposure to an “illicit 
lesbian sexual relationship.”92 The court concluded that most people would find 
the purpose of the defendant’s spying “justified.”93 
The court emphasized, curiously and perhaps disingenuously, that it was 
not Michael’s ex-wife’s homosexuality that made her a suspect custodial 
parent. According to the court, the result in Plaxico’s case would have been the 
same if the ex-wife had had an “illicit” affair with a man.94 The court did not 
define “illicit.” It left it to readers of its opinion to speculate about what would 
make a particular affair illicit. The court may have been alluding to the fact that 
certain heterosexual sex acts were illegal or had legal implications (e.g., sex 
with a married person, sex with an animal, sex with a minor, sex with a first-
degree relative, oral sex, or anal sex), but the court neglected to provide explicit 
clarification.  
A dissenting judge agreed with Rita Plaxico that “peeping into the 
bedroom window of another is a gross invasion of privacy,” and that the end 
did not justify the means.95 A second dissenting opinion described defendant 
Michael’s act as “voyeuristic”96 and suggested that because Plaxico was not 
party to the custody dispute, Michael did not have a right to take her picture. 
His ex-wife’s picture might have been sufficient. One could argue, though, that 
on the facts of the case Michael’s ex-wife would have had an intrusion claim as 
strong as her lover’s. 
 
87. Id.  
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 1040. 
90. Prior to Lawrence v. Texas, oral sex and anal sex could be criminalized. Many states 
kept on the books rarely enforced laws criminalizing these acts when performed by heterosexuals 
and/or homosexuals. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (“In those States where 
sodomy is still proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of 
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private.”). 
91. Plaxico, 735 So. 2d at 1040. 
92. Id. at 1039. 
93. Id. at 1040. 
94. Id. at 1040.  
95. Id. at 1040 (Banks, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 1041 (McRae, J., dissenting). 
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B. Intrusion: Verbal Intrusion, Prying 
Asking inappropriate personal questions and demanding personal 
information are common forms of what I call “verbal intrusion.” Asking 
invasive questions about sex and sexual orientation can amount to offensive 
verbal intrusion. Given the history of employment discrimination and violence 
targeting LGBT persons, a gay or lesbian employee could be expected to find 
even casual inquiries about sexual orientation in the workplace “highly 
offensive.” By contrast, a heterosexual employee might be offended by 
intrusive questions, but would not expect to risk injury or lose his or her job or 
social status for providing truthful answers.97  
In Madsen v. Erwin, Christine Madsen was fired from her writing post at 
the church-affiliated Christian Science Monitor when her lesbian sexual 
orientation became public.98 Madsen had no luck persuading some members of 
the Massachusetts high court that her supervisor tortiously intruded into her 
privacy by asking about her sexual orientation.99 Madsen sued the supervisor, 
the newspaper, the church, and several key officials in the church in a 
complaint alleging wrongful discharge, defamation, invasion of privacy, 
intentional infliction of mental distress, and other claims.100 Among her privacy 
claims, Madsen argued that the defendants disclosed information about her 
personal life to the public and placed her in a false light.101  
The Christian Science Monitor defendants lost their motion to dismiss and 
summary judgment motions, but the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
reversed in their favor on a key issue. The main question presented in the case 
was whether the First Amendment free exercise principle allowed the Christian 
Science Church to terminate Madsen’s employment on account of her sexual 
orientation.102 The court held that the church had a right of religious freedom 
under both federal and state constitutions to discharge Madsen.103 Yet, while 
the court noted that Madsen’s allegations in her complaint “do not survive 
attack by motion to dismiss,” it allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint 
with regard to the tort claims. 104 The court did not fully discuss the merits of 
those claims. In his separate opinion, Justice Francis Patrick O’Connor hinted 
that her privacy claims were likely to fail on privacy tort theories. The justice 
 
 97. Cf. Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(heterosexual married woman lost job after refusing to provide oral sex and answers to employer’s 
intrusive questions about her sex life).  
 98. Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985).  
 99. Id. at 1167.  
100. Id. at 1161.  
101. Id. at 1172.  
102. Id. at 1163–66; cf. Gunn v. Mariners Church, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008) (holding that “the ministerial exception . . . bars courts from reviewing employment 
decisions by religious organizations affecting employees who have religious duties of ministers”). 
103. Madsen, 481 N.E.2d at 1165–66.  
104. Id. at 1167. 
allenCLRfinalNoPagination.doc (Do Not Delete) 12/1/2010  4:33 PM 
116 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  XX:nnn 
reasoned that since the church could lawfully discharge the plaintiff because of 
her sexual orientation, by implication it could also question her about her 
sexual orientation.105  
In another verbal intrusion case, Morenz v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 
an employee similarly argued that being asked about his homosexual identity at 
work was intrusive.106 However, a coworker rather than a supervisor asked 
plaintiff Ralph Morenz about his sexual orientation, and the alleged prying was 
not accompanied by the threat of termination. Soon after Morenz’s company 
transferred him to a new office, a fellow employee there asked him whether he 
was gay.107 The coworker apparently asked the question because he wanted to 
make sure that Morenz knew his sexual orientation would not be a problem on 
the job.108  
In his suit Morenz complained of intrusion, isolation, and emotional 
distress due to his employer’s cruel lack of responsiveness to his inability to 
cope with gruesome aspects of his responsibilities as an accident claims 
adjuster.109 The court concluded that under the circumstances of the case the 
question, “Are you gay?” was not “highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
indeed, not offensive at all.”110  
The conclusion that the question is not offensive at all cuts off fact-finding 
and analysis concerning whether non-maliciously intended questions about 
sexual orientation could be offensive to a reasonable person. They might be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person because they are personal, patronizing, 
or presumptuous. They may be highly offensive because they enable potentially 
sensitive data to be shared with others in the workplace who may be less open-
minded and well-intended than the person who first posed the question. Unless 
courts consider factors such as gossip and discrimination vital to understanding 
the full context of the LGBT workplace experience, they will continue to 
conclude—often erroneously—that verbal intrusions against LGBT individuals 
are not “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”  
C. Intrusion: Verbal Insult and Disparagement 
Courts have often asserted that the privacy torts protect feelings and 
sensibilities.111 Plaintiffs have brought intrusion claims because they have felt 
 
105. Id. at 1172. 
106. Morenz v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 79979, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 2474 (Ohio 
Ct. App. May 23, 2002).  
107. Id. at **5. 
108. Id. at **5.   
109. Id. at **11–12. Morenz did not like his new post, which required him to handle 
insurance claims stemming from very serious accidents. Id. at **4–5. His employer was 
unresponsive to his requests for reassignment, and Morenz experienced symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder. Id. at **5. 
110. Id. at **5. 
111. Hence courts have repeatedly held that corporations, as fictitious entities without 
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insulted or disparaged by the use of unkind words.  
In Logan v. Sears, for example, a gay salon owner was speaking to a Sears 
employee by telephone when he overheard her describing him as “queer as a 
three-dollar bill.”112 Because the offensive language came to him over his own 
private phone line, he felt the unkindness constituted an intrusion.113 The court 
agreed that the statement made by Sears’s representative “was an intrusion 
upon Logan’s solitude or seclusion,”114 but found that it was not so extreme or 
outrageous as to offend an ordinary person. The word “queer,” according to the 
court, has been used for a longer time than the new term “gay.”115 Thus, the use 
of the word “queer” could not be described as “atrocious and intolerable in 
civilized society.”116 The court concluded that, because the plaintiff was truly 
gay, the use of the word “queer,” even though discouraged by the homosexual 
community at the time, did not cause humiliation.117 The court opined that in 
order to create a cause of action, the tortious conduct needed to cause mental 
suffering, shame, or humiliation to a reasonable person, “not [be] conduct 
which would be considered unacceptable merely by homosexuals.”118 It is 
unclear and never explained why the perspectives of a “reasonable” 
homosexual should be discounted in applying the standard “highly offensive to 
a reasonable person.” 
Unkind epithets have a greater chance of leading to actionable tort 
claims—either emotional distress claims or privacy invasion claims—when the 
epithets are combined with unlawful deeds. In Leibert v. Transworld Systems, a 
California man disparaged as “effeminate” and “a fag” alleged that he was 
discharged because of his homosexual orientation.119 The court concluded that 
his suit stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when 
viewed in the context of a pattern of workplace harassment and loss of 
employment in violation of state law.120 Similarly, but under privacy theories, a 
 
feelings and sensibilities, can have no common law right to privacy. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 652I cmt. c (1977). See generally Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule 
Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J. 
Marshall L. Rev. 607 (1987).  
112. Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 122 (Ala. 1985). 
113. Id. at 123.  
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 123–24.  
116. Id. at 123. 
117. Id. at 124.  
118. Id. 
119. Leibert v. Transworld Sys., Inc. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) 
(appellant alleged that he suffered discrimination based on his sexual orientation, violations of 
privacy rights protected under California’s state constitution, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress). 
120. Id. at 73 (“Employment discrimination, whether based upon sex, race, religion or 
sexual orientation, is invidious and violates a fundamental public policy of this state. . . . We 
conclude that he stated viable claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 
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lesbian businesswoman successfully alleged in Simpson v. Burrows that 
“Concerned Citizens of Christmas Valley” intentionally destroyed her business 
and personal life by distributing threatening and false anti-lesbian diatribes, 
including a letter attacking her as a “fag.”121 It is doubtful Simpson would have 
prevailed on a privacy theory had she complained of being called a fag but had 
not also lost her partner and livelihood. 
D. Intrusion: Intrusive Publication of Private Facts 
To establish a prima facie case of “intrusion,” plaintiffs must allege a 
highly offensive intrusion that may or may not lead to a publication of any 
information obtained as a consequence of intrusion. To establish a prima facie 
case of “publication of private fact,” plaintiffs must allege that defendants 
disseminated private facts to others, whether orally or in writing. Intrusion 
claims have sometimes been accompanied by claims for publication of private 
fact. Blurring the distinction between two of Prosser’s torts, LGBT plaintiffs 
experience unwanted publicity as a kind of intrusion. We might call the offense 
“intrusive publication of private facts.” The essence of these cases in not an 
allegation of physical intrusion, prying, or disparagement, but instead an 
allegation that it is intrusion into private life for others to reveal one’s secrets or 
to dredge up embarrassments. 
1. Secrets Revealed 
In Prince v. Out Publishing, gay actor and model Tony Sabin Prince lost a 
case in which he claimed numerous privacy torts, including publication of 
private fact and intrusion.122 As I will elaborate in Part III, defendant Out 
magazine published photos of the plaintiff in an article entitled “Dirty 
Dancing.”123 The article described various improprieties at gay men’s “circuit 
parties,” including abuse of illicit drugs and unsafe sexual practices.124 The 
article included three photographs of Mr. Prince.125 The first photograph 
occupied two pages of the magazine and pictured Prince shirtless, dancing with 
another man.126 The second pictured Prince’s torso and face, and the third 
pictured his face alone.127 The photographs of the plaintiff were taken without 
his permission at a party in Los Angeles, where cameras were supposedly not 
permitted.128  
Prince alleged that the photos implied he was gay, a drug user, and a 
 
121. Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000).  
122. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002). 
123. Id. at *1.  
124. Id.  
125. Id.  
126. Id.  
127. Id.  
128. Id.  
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person who engaged in unsafe sex.129 Prince was in fact gay.130 But he did not 
abuse drugs, did not engage in unsafe sex, and did not attend the parties 
described in the article.131 In response to Prince’s request, Out later published a 
clarification, stating that the pictures accompanying the article in question were 
taken at a different sort of party than the one described in the article, and that 
“the appearance of any specific individuals in those photographs is not intended 
to imply that they engage in any specific behaviors discussed in the article.”132 
Still, Mr. Prince maintained that the photographs in Out exposed for the first 
time his homosexual orientation to his family, professional associates, and 
some of his friends.133  
On his intrusion claim, the court determined that Prince did not have an 
objective expectation of seclusion or solitude at the party he had attended, 
because the public at large had been invited to purchase a ticket by phone, at 
the door, or from the club, and approximately one thousand people attended the 
party.134 If a person can be unlawfully stalked or sexually harassed in a 
crowded public place,135 it is unclear why a person cannot be a victim of a 
privacy intrusion while at a party. The courts could easily construe the targeting 
of a person in a public place for a photograph intended for publication without 
his consent as an unwelcome intrusion, as indeed they have in the past.136 But 
arguably the relevant intrusion at issue was the magazine’s interference with 
the plaintiff’s partially secret personal life through the inadvertent “outing” and 
potential character distortion.  
2. Embarrassments Dredged Up 
The memorable “Boys of Boise” case, Uranga v Federated Publications, 
commenced when plaintiff Fred Uranga sued an Idaho newspaper for privacy 
invasion (including intrusion) and infliction of emotional distress. The Idaho 
Statesman published a photographic copy of a forty-year old statement made to 
authorities by a man named Melvin Dir, who implicated Uranga in homosexual 
activities. Mr. Dir had been prosecuted for sex felonies, including forcing 
teenager Frank Jones to submit to oral sex. Dir claimed the sex was consensual 
and that Jones had led him to believe he had had earlier homosexual encounters 
with his cousin Fred Uranga and a high school classmate.137  
 
129. Id.  
130. Id.  
131. Id.  
132. Id. at *2. 
133. Id. at *2.  
134. Id. at *8.  
135. Cf. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (popular former First Lady 
Jacqueline Kenney Onassis sought and obtained an injunction requiring photographer to keep a 
safe distance from her and her children John and Carolyn Kennedy). 
136. See, e.g., id. 
137. Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 31 (Idaho 2003) (aftermath of infamous 
scandal in which hundreds of people were suspected of involvement in soliciting homosexual 
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Uranga’s failed claim of intrusion was modeled on claims made in what 
are generally considered “private fact” cases such as Melvin v. Reid and 
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest.138 But there was a difference: Uranga did not admit 
to the dredged-up embarrassing (to him) ascription of homosexuality, whereas 
Melvin admitted prostitution and criminal prosecution, and Briscoe admitted to 
hijacking.139 The court noted Uranga’s claim for intrusion, but said it had not 
been clearly articulated in the lawsuit.140 Attempting to make sense of it, the 
court speculated that the only possible intrusion at issue was an “intrusion” into 
public court records that related to the plaintiff.141 Following the precedent of 
two landmark Supreme Court cases, Florida Star v. B.J.F. and Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,142 the Uranga court held that neither the 
examination of public records nor their publication could be the basis for an 
intrusion claim.143 
And yet publication of allegations about one’s past sex life that one 
regards as embarrassments can certainly feel like what in colloquial terms we 
could describe as an intrusion. Uranga and Prince reflect a gap between the 
broad, ordinary, informal conceptions of intrusion and the narrow formal legal 
conception of the intrusion tort. The design of formal doctrine precluded hybrid 
“intrusive publication” claims by Fred Uranga and Tony Sabin Prince. These 
plaintiffs were forced separately to plead intrusion upon seclusion and 
publication of private fact, losing on both causes of action.  
E. Limited Utility 
Overall, LGBT plaintiffs have not had much luck with the intrusion tort, 
whether alleging surveillance, prying, insult, disparagement, or publicly 
revealing partly hidden aspects of private life. Rita Plaxico’s memorable case 
 
activity from minors associated with the YMCA in Boise, Idaho). 
138. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 
P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). 
139. Cf. Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1407, 1414 (2009) (quoting Lawrence Friedman, Guarding Life’s Dark 
Secrets: Legal and Social Controls over Reputation, Propriety, 
and Privacy 218 (2009) (claiming that Melvin may have been an active prostitute at the time 
she sued those responsible for calling attention to her history of homicide acquittal and 
prostitution)). 
140. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32.  
141. Id. at 32–33.  
142. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that First Amendment bars press 
liability in case where, in violation of state law, newspaper published name of woman who 
survived a rape after inexperienced reporter copied her name from police reports inadvertently 
made available to press); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that First 
Amendment bars media liability in case where, in violation of state law, television station 
broadcast name of murdered rape victim obtained from police records). The court also cited Baker 
v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978), where the court found no privacy 
invasion where defendant has accessed court records. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 32. 
143. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35. 
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against Glenn Michael is illustrative. Ms. Plaxico’s case did not survive a 
motion to dismiss despite the fact that Mr. Michael had driven his truck to the 
secluded cabin where she lived with his ex-wife, watched her through a 
window having sex with his ex-wife, and photographed her partly nude and 
seated on her bed.144 The appeals court found that this egregious invasion was 
not “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” since “a reasonable person would 
not feel Michael’s interference with Plaxico’s seclusion was a substantial one 
that would rise to the required level of gross offensiveness.”145 Along with 
Plaxico, other disappointed privacy tort plaintiffs were Prince, Uranga, Logan, 
Madsen, Morenz, and Elmore.  
Based on the cases I analyzed, the intrusion tort has not been, nor 
promises to be, a useful a remedy for LGBT plaintiffs seeking monetary or 
injunctive relief. One would draw a different conclusion upon discovery of a 
cache of intrusion claims favorably settled by LGBT plaintiffs prior to pretrial 
motions, judgments, and appeals. One would also draw a different conclusion 
with strong empirical evidence of the intrusion tort’s deterrent effect. But in the 
absence of evidence either of a strong deterrent effect or a history of favorable 
settlements, I conclude based on the available evidence that the intrusion tort is 
a tort of minimal practical utility to LGBT plaintiffs. 
III 
PUBLICATION OF PRIVATE FACT 
Prosser’s publication of private fact tort146 is a favorite with privacy 
litigants. Ill-fated publication actions have even been brought on behalf of the 
dead.147 New technologies and contemporary lifestyles add to the avenues 
through which actionable publication offenses can occur. In a recent case, a 
lesbian sued the popular online movie-rental company Netflix, alleging that it 
collected information on subscribers’ rental histories from which their sexual 
orientations could be inferred and disclosed.148  
 
144. Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Miss. 1999). 
145. Id. at 1039. 
146. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
Publicity Given to Private Life 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized 
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is 
not of legitimate concern to the public. 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 652D (1977). 
147. See e.g., Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex 1979) (parents’ 
publication of private fact suit against media defendant who reported that their murdered son had 
had a homosexual affair with his employer dismissed). The general common law rule applicable to 
all of the privacy torts is that right to privacy actions survive death, but new privacy claims for 
post death offenses are not actionable. See e.g., Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1983) (adult children’s false light privacy suit against media defendant who reported that 
their deceased father was a homosexual and Nazi spy dismissed).  
148. Valdez-Marquez v. Netflix Inc., No. C09-05903-JW-PVT (N.D. Cal. dismissed Mar. 
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The LGBT community has had mixed luck with the publication of private 
tort. On its face, a doctrine of civil liability for disclosures of private facts could 
deter and redress unwanted revelations and “outings.” The tort has served well 
several plaintiffs whose closeted gender traits, sexual orientation, or birth sex 
were revealed to the public without their consent.149 But it failed to provide a 
remedy for others.150 In many cases, plaintiffs’ failure to establish a 
“publication” or “private fact” to the satisfaction of the court precluded 
recovery. Instead or in addition, the First Amendment precluded a tort remedy 
in some cases, effectively privileging media defendants eager to construe 
nearly everything that preoccupies or vexes daily life as matters of legitimate 
public interest.151  
When Prosser addressed the public disclosure tort fifty years ago, he 
volunteered no sidebar on how a public facts tort could deter or remedy 
unwanted attention to the fact that someone is homosexual, bisexual or 
transgender. But Prosser did reference Cason v. Baskin,152 a noteworthy public 
disclosure of private fact case in which a woman sued a writer whose best-
selling memoir portrayed her as having a striking mix of masculine and 
feminine traits.153 Although Prosser mentioned in passing the celebrated Cross 
Creek154 case and seemed to grasp that it concerned unwanted attention to 
unconventional, culturally transgressive gender traits and sex roles, he nowhere 
noted a distinct feature of the body of case law that included and surrounded it: 
gender norms played a role in the development of the right to privacy and its 
recognition by the courts.155 In its first decades, the right to privacy was often 
 
29, 2010). 
149. Borquez v. Ozer, 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995) (disclosure of HIV status by 
employer was wrongful publication of private fact), rev’d on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 
1997). 
150. See, e.g., Cinel v. Connick 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (information contained 
in public record is not “private”). 
151. See, e.g., Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App. 
2001) (television station story regarding a custody proceeding where one parent raised concerns 
for the child’s safety is of legitimate public interest a protected by First Amendment, and facts 
about sexual orientation and HIV status revealed in court are no longer private and may be 
published with impunity by media). 
152. Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944). Cason v. Baskin was the Florida courts’ 
first opportunity to embrace or to reject the right to privacy, and it embraced it. Id. at 244 (“The 
first and the main question presented here is whether an action may be maintained in this State for 
an invasion of the right of privacy.”). The papers concerning the trial and its defendant are 
archived at U. Fla., George A. Smathers Libraries, A Guide to the Cross Creek 
Trial (Cason v. Baskin) Papers, 
http://web.uflib.ufl.edu/spec/manuscript/guides/CasonvBaskin.htm. 
153. See generally Patricia Nassif Acton, Invasion of Privacy: The 
Cross Creek Trial of Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings (1988).  
154. Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings, Cross Creek (1942).  
155. See generally Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. 
Ill. U. L. Rev. 441 (1990) (arguing that concerns about the need to protect women’s 
privacy spirited the early development of privacy law); cf. Robert E. Mensel, The Anti-
Progressive Origins and Uses of the Right to Privacy in the Federal Courts 1860–1937, 3 Fed. 
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asserted by women—and on women’s behalf—to vindicate the women’s 
perceived interest in modesty, seclusion, propriety, and genteel refinement.156 
Cason v. Baskin fits the pattern of privacy suits brought to vindicate female 
character: “You have made a hussy out of me” was the plaintiff’s accusation to 
her defendant.157  
A. Public Attention to Unconventional Gender Traits and Sex Roles 
In Cason v. Baskin, quaintly designated “feme sole” Zelma Cason, a rural 
Alachua County social worker and census-taker, sued to recover $100,000 from 
her friend and neighbor, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author Marjorie Kinnan 
Baskin (pen name Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings).158 In 1942, Baskin published 
Cross Creek, an autobiographical work containing character portraits of her 
friends and neighbors, including her friend Zelma Cason.159 One chapter of the 
memoir recounted Baskin’s observations as she accompanied Cason on 
horseback on her census-taking duties in Florida’s backwoods. Baskin depicted 
Cason colorfully as “an ageless spinster resembling an angry and efficient 
canary.”160 She described her as competent in the management of her orange 
groves, nurturing, and at ease among Negros.161 “I cannot decide whether she 
should have been a man or a mother [as she] combines the more violent 
characteristics of both,”162 Baskin wrote. Never using her subject’s surname, 
Baskin quoted Cason’s use of salty expressions such as “sons of [bitches],” 
“those [bastards],” and “It’s a [goddamn] blessing.”163  
Cason denied the accuracy of Baskin’s portrayal and alleged defamation 
as well as privacy invasion. The court framed Cason’s complaint as one about 
the defendant’s publication of sensitive private facts, even though Baskin’s 
“vivid and intimate character sketch” did not reveal much of anything about 
Cason that was not already generally known or believed true in her 
community.164 As weak as her privacy claim may have been, Cason’s libel 
claims were weaker. Trial witnesses affirmed that Cason had a temper, cursed 
frequently, and generously provided charitable succor to the poor, as Baskin 
 
Cts. L. Rev. 109, 112 (2009) (citing 19th-century federal court cases in which judges 
rendered opinions “valuing female privacy more than male” and reflecting “prevailing bourgeois 
understandings of gender and race”). 
156. See generally Allen & Mack, supra note 155. 
157. Acton, supra note 153, at 24. 
158. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 244–45. 
159. Rawlings, supra note 154. See the blog devoted to the Cross Creek Trial, which 
includes discussion of the woman-as-man discourse, http://crosscreektrial.com/2009/12/a-bunch-
of-mannish-hussies/. 
160. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 245.  
161. Id. at 245–46 (quoting passages from Rawlings, supra note 154). 
162. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 245. 
163. Id. at 245–46. 
164. Id. at 247. The memoir was offensive to Cason more because of what it called 
attention to than because of what it revealed.  
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described.165 Moreover, “it was hard to ignore Zelma’s masculine leanings.” 166  
Cason won at trial. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court held that “in 
spite of the fact that the publication complained of, considered as a whole, 
portrays the plaintiff as a fine and attractive personality,” Cason had stated a 
cause of action potentially worthy of at least nominal damages for invasion of 
her private life.167 The court speculated that Cason might be one of those 
people who “do not want their acts of charity publicized” in a book’s “vivid 
and intimate character sketch.”168 The Florida high court pointed to Cason’s 
“acts of charity”169 as the facts she preferred to downplay, bringing to mind 
Schuyler v. Curtis.170 By contrast, Prosser stressed Cason’s “masculine 
characteristics” as the private facts she had wished to downplay. Prosser 
summarized Cason’s injury as publication of “embarrassing details of a 
woman’s masculine characteristics, her domineering tendencies, her habits of 
profanity, and incidents of her personal conduct towards friends and 
neighbors.”171 Prosser got closer to the truth than the Florida court. Cason 
reportedly felt angry and betrayed by a friend rather than embarrassed about 
any specific public disclosures.172 Cason was furious when she read what 
Baskin wrote about her.173 When they met after the book’s publication, Cason 
accused Baskin of making a “hussy” out of her.174 Cason, who sat knitting 
demurely throughout her trial,175 was offended that by writing about her as she 
did, her friend Baskin portrayed her as a cultural abomination, a morally 
transgressing female.176  
B. Gay, Straight or Bisexual: Public Attention to Sexual Orientation 
Efforts to reinforce gender norms are a recognized dimension of privacy 
case law, including the publication of private fact cases of which Cason is an 
 
165. Acton, supra note 153, at 31, 92–94. 
166. Id. at 30 (“She wore pants at every possible opportunity, taught her niece and nephew 
to shoot, and enjoyed an occasional boxing match. And she was not above a show of violence if it 
suited her purposes.”). 
167. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 247. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (family sought to prevent 
the public display of a bust created in the image of a woman philanthropist who was a “woman of 
great refinement and cultivation”). 
171. Prosser, supra note 10, at 393. 
172. Acton, supra note 153, at 144. But see id. at 144 (“Though she was never completely 
happy with her portrayal in Cross Creek, Zelma found it in her heart to forgive Marjorie . . . .”). 
173. Id. at 24, 25. 
174. Id.  
175. Id. at 80–81 (“As Zelma knitted, her ball of yarn—through intent or accident—
repeatedly fell from her lap and rolled under the table. [The defendant’s husband, Norton] Baskin, 
being the gentleman that he was, stooped down each time to retrieve it.”).  
176. Id. at 24; see also id. at 115 (counsel for plaintiff arguing rhetorically that defendant 
Baskin might be unaware that in the deep South “‘old maid’ is a fighting term”).  
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especially interesting early example. What of sexual orientation and sexual 
identity related norms? Has the privacy tort been deployed to reinforce them as 
well? The answer is that to an extent LGBT plaintiffs (of both sexes) have 
sought through the publication of private fact tort to preserve the problematic 
convention of lives sheltered in layers of inaccessibility and reserve. Courts 
have sometimes gone along, asserting that sexual orientation is private in 
nature, as in Borquez v. Ozer.177 
Robert P. Borquez was a successful associate in a law firm, terminated 
after informing his employer that his male partner had recently received an 
HIV-positive diagnosis.178 Before the disclosure Borquez hid his homosexual 
orientation at work.179 After losing his job, he sued for wrongful discharge and 
for wrongful publication of his sexual orientation and possible HIV status.180 
The jury awarded $30,841 in lost wages for wrongful discharge, $20,000 for 
embarrassment on the publication of private facts claim, and $40,000 in 
exemplary damages.181 The appellate court affirmed,182 holding that sexual 
orientation and exposure to HIV are private matters.183 Disclosing these details 
is offensive to a reasonable person because both homosexuality and AIDS are 
stigmatized.184 Further, the court held that disclosing information regarding 
HIV was not in this instance disclosure of a matter of legitimate concern to the 
public.185 
Courts have not been uniform in their willingness to allow a tort recovery 
when information or allegations about sexual orientation have come out.186 For 
example, in Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television the court held that even if 
homosexual identity is a private matter, the plaintiff policeman’s homosexual 
identity and HIV positive status did not remain so once revealed during judicial 
proceedings, such as a child custody proceeding.187  
A similar outcome greeted a gay priest man in an earlier case, Cinel v. 
Connick.188 Authorities found homosexual pornography in the residence of 
Dino Cinel, a Roman Catholic priest, along with a videotape of him engaging 
in consensual homosexual sex with two adult men.189 The defendants in the 
case included several state officials who released the videotape to a reporter 
 
177. 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997). 
178. Id. at 169.  
179. Id. at 169–70.  
180. Id. at 170.  
181. Id. at 171.   
182. Id. at 179.   
183. Id. at 172.  
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 173.  
186. See, e.g,, Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 33 (Idaho 2003). 
187. Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App. 2001); see 
generally Hilzendeger, supra note 12. 
188. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994). 
189. Id. at 1340.  
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and a television network. The television network broadcasted excerpts from the 
tape.190 Plaintiff Cinel subsequently brought a Section 1983 claim against the 
state officials for violating his constitutional privacy rights by disclosing the 
names of the people who were taped having sex with him; by revealing their 
identities to unrelated third parties; and by releasing the materials to private 
litigants, including the church and the other participants in the sex acts.191 The 
court rejected the claim, stating that the identities of the people and their 
addresses were not part of the plaintiff’s private life.192 In addition, the church 
and the participants in the sex acts had previous knowledge about the materials, 
so the information was not private as to them.193 The state officials were 
similarly shielded from liability, as they acted lawfully in disclosing materials 
pursuant to a valid subpoena.194  
Plaintiff Cinel also claimed a publication of private facts tort under 
Louisiana Civil Code.195 The trial court rejected this claim, finding that the 
materials were a matter of legitimate public concern since sodomy was a crime 
at the time.196 In addition, the court concluded that identification of the 
participants by state officials was a matter that needed to be reviewed by the 
public.197 This public need was strengthened by the fact that plaintiff Cinel had 
engaged in the private activity while he was a priest.198 Finally, the court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that broadcasting the videotape added no value to 
the story, even if it was not newsworthy.199 According to the court, it may have 
been insensitive to publish the videotape, but the judiciary could not make 
decisions for the media as to what should be published.200  
The Uranga case introduced in Part II is reintroduced here alongside 
Crumrine and Cinel, as another example of the failure of a publication of 
private fact tort claim where concealments have come to light as a consequence 
of public records and media reports.201 Fred Uranga brought an action against 
the publisher of the Idaho Statesman daily newspaper.202 The newspaper 
published an article accompanied by a photograph of a handwritten statement 
by an accused sex offender implicating Uranga in youthful homosexual 
activity.203  
 
190. Id. at 1341.  
191. Id.  
192. Id. at 1342–43.  
193. Id.  
194. Id. at 1343.   
195. Id. at 1345. 
196. Id. at 1346.  
197. Id.  
198. Id.  
199. Id.  
200. Id.   
201. Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29 (Idaho 2003). 
202. Id. at 31.   
203. Id. at 30.   
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Uranga filed a complaint for intrusion, publication of private facts, false 
light, and intentional and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress.204 The trial 
court granted a motion to dismiss in favor of the newspaper.205 The court of 
appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Idaho vacated the judgment of the trial 
court, but upon the newspaper’s petition for rehearing, the court reversed 
itself.206 The court dismissed the publication of private facts claim on the 
ground that the offending statement was on public record.207 The court held that 
a statement implicating an individual in homosexual activity that happened 
forty years earlier is not a private fact because the statement was part of a court 
record available to the press.208  
In distinguishing his claim from Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,209 
Uranga argued that in Cox the information concerned a current criminal 
prosecution, while the statement to which he was objecting had been made to 
police forty years earlier.210 The court rejected this distinction, stating that 
freedom of speech does not have a timeline.211 Uranga also argued that his 
name was not newsworthy.212 The court rejected this argument as well, citing 
the Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,213 which 
held that determination of whether a publication is a matter of public concern is 
based upon an examination of the publication as a whole.214 Even if Uranga’s 
name was not newsworthy, the article about the Boys of Boise scandal was 
newsworthy for First Amendment purposes.215 The dismissal of Uranga’s 
intentional infliction of emotional stress claim was affirmed because the 
newspaper enjoyed First Amendment protection.216  
While the above cases show that the private fact theory has not guaranteed 
victory for closeted homosexuals,217 they also show that courts are prepared to 
 
204. Id. at 31.   
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 30. The high court rejected the intrusion claim because Uranga did not state any 
kind of intrusion into a place, or any uncomfortable investigation. The newspaper only 
investigated what was in the public record and did not intrude on Uranga’s seclusion. Id. at 32. 
Uranga abandoned the false light claim, perhaps because he believed the court would find a duty 
of verifying every court document quoted or reproduced to be an unreasonable burden on 
newspapers.  
207. Id. at 33.  
208. Id.  
209. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (First Amendment bars media 
liability for broadcasting the lawfully obtained identity and photograph of a rape and murder 
victim despite a Georgia statute prohibiting the publication of the identities of rape victims). 
210. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35. 
211. Id.  
212. Id. 
213. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).  
214. Uranga, 67 P.3d at 35. 
215. Id.  
216. Id. 
217. Uranga’s actual sexual orientation is unclear. He denied the sexual involvement he felt 
was implied by the statement and its republication in the Idaho Statesman.  
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voice the ideal that sexual orientation is prima facie private. Simpson v. 
Burrows, though its facts are extreme, reveals the possibility of complete 
victory for a gay woman relying on the public disclosure or privacy fact tort.218 
Jo Anne Simpson brought claims of intimidation, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and libel against the defendant couple 
Howard and Jean Burrows.219 Ms. Simpson and her female partner moved to 
the small town of Christmas Valley, Oregon, where they purchased a 
restaurant.220 Soon after their arrival and purchase of the restaurant, threatening 
and offensive letters warning people against the lesbian couple were circulated 
around town.221 Letters were sent to Simpson and her partner with threatening 
content, such as “NO FAGS IN C.V. [Christmas Valley]” and “IT’S YOUR 
TURN TO GO[,] HEAD FIRST OR FEET FIRST.”222 Letters were also sent to 
other people and business owners in the town.223 They called on citizens to 
boycott the restaurant due to the “perverts” who owned it, and they threatened 
that the restaurant would turn into “a mecca for Queers, Lesbians, Perverts & 
other degenerates.”224 The Burrows’ letters had a greatly adverse effect on 
Simpson’s life225 and were among the principal reasons Simpson’s partner left 
her and fled Christmas Valley.226 Simpson testified that she felt threatened and 
lost trust in people, and even bought a gun for protection.227 In support of her 
claim for economic damages, Simpson pointed out that as soon as the letter 
distribution commenced, fewer people patronized her restaurant business and 
she was forced to sell it at a loss.228  
After finding the Burrowses responsible for sending the hateful letters that 
ruined Simpson’s personal life and destroyed her livelihood,229 the court held in 
favor for Simpson on her claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
intimidation, and publication of private facts. The court concluded that the 
defendants intended to cause the plaintiff emotional distress and that their 
behavior was virtually criminal.230 Though the Burrowses had the constitutional 
right to dislike homosexuality and to express their views, those rights did not 
grant them immunity from liability for direct threats.231  
 
218. Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1125 (D. Or. 2000). 
219. Id. at 1112. 
220. Id. at 1113.  
221. Id. at 1114. 
222. Id.  
223. Id. at 1115.  
224. Id. at 1114.  
225. Id.  
226. Id. at 1121.  
227. Id.  
228. Id.  
229. Id. at 1120.  
230. The court rejected Simpson’s libel claims because they were barred by the statute of 
limitations and because defendants were entitled to their offensive opinions about the plaintiff’s 
lesbian sexual orientation. Id. at 1124.  
231. Id.  
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With respect to the disclosure of private facts claim, the court found that 
sexual orientation is a private fact that the defendants publicized to a large 
number of people.232 The disclosure contained in the letters was “extremely 
outrageous” and thus was of the “highly objectionable kind.”233 Based on her 
valid privacy claims the court awarded Simpson $200,000 in noneconomic 
damages, $52,500 in economic damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages.234 
The Burrows case illustrates that privacy invasions are actionable not only 
when unknown secrets are disclosed, but also when information is moved 
without consent from one social network into another. The case thus represents 
Professor Lior Strahilevitz’s theory in action:235 facts can be private, not merely 
because they are secrets, but also because they are sensitive and have been 
released into new social networks with malicious intent. The Burrows court 
therefore implicitly endorsed an important point of view other courts have 
not—that LGBT persons have a right to selective disclosure of their sexual 
orientations. 
C. Publication of Birth Sex of Transgender Persons  
In an important California case in the tradition of Melvin v. Reid,236 the 
court in Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc. reasoned that a transgender person’s 
birth sex is a private matter and not newsworthy per se, even if she has become 
a public figure.237 Plaintiff-respondent Toni Diaz was a transgender woman 
born as a biological male.238 She underwent a sex-corrective procedure in 
1975.239 The surgery was a success, and society perceived Diaz as a woman. 
She kept her former sex a secret, except to her immediate family and closest 
friends.240 Selective disclosure to a small group enabled her to break with the 
past, avoid constant scrutiny, and move on to enjoy a new life. She legally 
changed her name, social security card, and driver’s license.241 After the 
surgery, Diaz enrolled in the College of Alameda, and was eventually elected 
as the student body president.242 She was the first woman to hold this office.243  
 
232. Id. at 1125.  
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 1131. 
235. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 919 (2005). 
236. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (filmmakers violated privacy of 
woman whose past life as a prostitute and accused murderer was resurrected and turned into a 
motion picture using her real name); see also Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 
1971). But see Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). 
237. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
238. Id. at 765.  
239. Id.  
240. Id.  
241. Id.  
242. Id.  
243. Id.   
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Diaz did not reveal her birth sex to the student body at College of 
Alameda.244 A columnist from the Oakland Tribune found out about her gender 
reassignment surgery from confidential sources.245 In the process of seeking to 
verify facts provided by those sources, the columnist discovered that before 
surgery Diaz had been arrested as a male for soliciting an undercover 
policeman but was never convicted of the crime.246 With proof of Diaz’s birth 
sex in hand, the columnist published a mocking article revealing that Diaz had 
been born a male.247  
Diaz brought an action for publication of private facts.248 Diaz maintained 
that the publication caused her depression, interrupted her college education, 
and led to insomnia, nightmares, and memory lapses.249 The jury found that the 
defendant newspaper and columnist who disclosed the plaintiff’s transsexual 
identity had publicly disclosed private facts, that the facts were private and not 
newsworthy, that the disclosure was highly offensive to a reasonable person, 
that the defendants knew the disclosure was highly offensive, and that the 
disclosure caused injury to the plaintiff.250 The jury awarded Diaz $250,000 in 
compensatory damages and $525,000 in punitive damages.251  
The defendants appealed, challenging the jury’s findings that the 
plaintiff’s birth sex was a private fact and not newsworthy.252 The appeals court 
reversed and ordered a new trial on two grounds: instructional error and failure 
to meet the burden of proof of newsworthiness.253 While the trial court 
instructed the jury that the defendant needed to present a “compelling public 
need” in order to abridge the plaintiff’s privacy right,254 it should have 
instructed that the defendant needed to show “legitimate interest” in exposing 
the private facts.255 In addition, the trial court improperly instructed the jury 
that the burden of proof was on the defendant to prove newsworthiness, when it 
was actually the plaintiff who needed to prove that the publication was not 
privileged.256  
Although the appellate court ordered a new trial, it reflected on the merits 
of the arguments and sided with plaintiff Diaz. This court, like the Oregon 
court in the Simpson case, implicitly endorsed an interest in selective 
disclosure. The court found that Diaz’s “sexual identity,” meaning her birth sex 
 
244. Id.   
245. Id. at 766. 
246. Id.   
247. Id. 
248. Id.  
249. Id.  
250. Id.   
251. Id. at 762.   
252. Id. at 766.  
253. Id. at 768.  
254. Id.  
255. Id. at 762.  
256. Id. at 769.  
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and transgender status, was a private matter even though it was not a complete 
secret. The court distinguished its determination from the Supreme Court ruling 
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.257 In Cox, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
father of a deceased rape victim could not file a publication of private facts tort 
claim against the media outlets that disclosed his daughter’s name in 
connection with the incident.258 The Supreme Court mainly based its decision 
on the fact that the daughter’s name already appeared in the indictment.259 In 
contrast, the court in Diaz found that the plaintiff’s birth information was not 
part of the public record.260 Diaz took affirmative steps to alter the public 
record to indicate her female identity.261 According to the public record of her 
life, she was a female.262 The police record concerning the solicitation of an 
officer did not even mention Diaz’s new female name263—the journalist made 
the connection based on confidential sources rather than public records.264 The 
court reasoned that even if the plaintiff’s original birth certificate could be 
viewed as a public record, the defendants had not seen it before the article 
published.265  
The court then rejected the defendants’ argument that since plaintiff Diaz 
was a public figure as the first female student body president of a public 
college, the article they wrote and published was newsworthy.266 While the 
court conceded that, as a matter of law, a person who seeks out a public 
position waives his or her right to privacy, the court held that Diaz was at best a 
“limited-purpose” public figure who did not abandon all privacy interests.267 
The plaintiff’s status as the first female student body president did not mean 
she was not entitled to keep her “domestic activities and sexual relations 
private.”268 And the court found the plaintiff’s gender transformation would not 
affect her honesty or judgment so as to render her publicly accountable for her 
private life.269 Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the case 
was newsworthy because it reflected a change in women’s positions in 
society.270 In the court’s view, the columnist had no academic news intent. 
 
257. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
258. Id.; see also Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 771 (discussing the holding in Cox).  
259. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.  
260. Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 771. 
261. Id.  
262. Id.  
263. Id.  
264. Id.  
265. Id. It is worth noting that original birth certificates are commonly sealed and not 
available even to the people they concern; in most U.S. jurisdictions, adults adopted as infants and 
seeking their “true” identities are for that reason alone not granted access to their original birth 
certificates.  
266. Id. at 766.  
267. Id. at 773.  
268. Id. 
269. Id.  
270. Id.  
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Rather, his clear attempt to mock the plaintiff undercut any claim that he was 
trying to educate the public.271  
The court also rejected the argument that awarding punitive damages was 
improper because the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant acted with 
malice or intent to injure.272 The court held that the defendant did not just 
publish the article but had exacerbated Diaz’s injury by making her the “brunt 
of a joke.”273 The columnist did not even bother to ask Diaz for her consent 
prior to publishing the article (despite the lack of a deadline) but instead threw 
his energies into efforts to acquire sensitive information about her.274 A 
reasonable jury could have taken this disparity of effort as evidence of 
malice.275 The court also found the newspaper liable for punitive damages 
because it approved and published the columnist’s article.276  
The court rejected the argument that the compensatory damages awarded 
were excessive.277 The defendants argued that the special damages presented by 
Diaz were only $800 for psychotherapy.278 The court concluded that the 
damages were not limited to out-of-pocket losses, but included personal 
suffering and humiliation.279 The court also ruled that the damages were not 
easy to evaluate and should be left for the jury to decide.280 The Diaz case 
sends a message that invading the privacy of a transgender woman is a serious 
offense that can lead to liability in the form of substantial compensatory and 
punitive damages.  
In stark contrast to Diaz’s broad success with the merits of her privacy 
claims, another court was less willing to view information dredged up about a 
transgender person’s birth sex as private and not newsworthy. In Schuler v. 
McGraw-Hill Cos., the plaintiff Eleanor Schuler, the CEO of Printron Inc., was 
a male-to-female transgender woman.281 Schuler sued the publisher of Business 
Week and its employees for publishing an article that allegedly defamed her, 
interfered with her business relations, invaded her privacy, and caused her 
emotional distress.282 Published in 1994, the article criticized the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) for failing to examine the registration statements of 
Printron and other Emerging Company Marketplace firms.283 The article 
referred to Schuler’s status as a transgender woman and mentioned a lawsuit 
 
271. Id.  
272. Id. at 773–74.  
273. Id. at 774. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 774.  
276. Id. 
277. Id. at 774–75.  
278. Id. at 774.  
279. Id. 
280. Id. at 775.  
281. Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F. Supp. 1377 (D.N.M. 1997). 
282. Id. at 1382. 
283. Id. at 1383.  
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that had been filed against her when she was still a man.284 According to 
Schuler, the article implied that she had “changed her sex in order to conceal an 
SEC filing rather than to cure her gender dysphoria syndrome.”285 Schuler’s 
complaint alleged several torts, three of which were from Prosser’s four 
categories: publication of private fact, intrusion, and false light.286 The court 
granted Business Week’s motion to dismiss on all counts. Without strongly 
siding with Schuler, it bears pointing out that her suit was not without a tinge of 
merit. 
The Diaz court and the Schuler court reached dramatically different 
assessments of the merits of the private fact claims of their respective plaintiffs. 
Although both cases involve a private fact claim brought by a transgender 
woman, the primary difference between the two cases was the degree of 
secrecy the women accorded to their birth sex. Diaz, the woman elected class 
president, had not made her transgender status public to the world at large, but 
Schuler had. Rejecting Schuler’s publication of private facts claim, the court 
appropriately pointed out that in the 1970s she had given interviews to The 
Washington Post and People Magazine recounting her sex change, making the 
facts a matter of public record.287 It could be argued, however, that those 
interviews had lapsed into practical obscurity.288  
Schuler’s intrusion claim, which the court rejected, struck the court as pro 
forma because all Schuler had done to support it was to restate the same facts 
and arguments used to support her weak publication of private facts tort 
claim.289 Unsurprisingly, the court held that Schuler failed to state a claim for 
intrusion.290  
The court held that the references to Schuler’s transsexual status were not 
false or defamatory.291 In doing so, it dealt inadequately with whether the 
article placed her in a false light. With regard to defamation, the court analyzed 
twenty-eight sentences in the Business Week article, some of them pointing to 
the plaintiff’s sex change.292 The court concluded that the article raised the 
legitimate question of whether the sex change was an advantage for Schuler, 
 
284. Id.  
285. Id. at 1384–85.  
286. Id. at 1389–90.  
287. Id. at 1390.  
288. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
770 (1989) (that “an event is not wholly ‘private’ does not mean that an individual has no interest 
in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.”); id. at 780 (“The privacy interest in 
maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high.”). 
289. Schuler, 989 F. Supp. at 1390.  
290. Id. Today, calling attention to personal facts about a person is the kind of thing we 
might regard in ordinary parlance as intrusive. But to plead the intrusion privacy tort, a plaintiff 
must allege and prove facts that go to the elements of the tort. Even when the facts are alleged and 
a paradigm instance of intrusion is seemingly proven, as in Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 
1038 (Miss. 1999), an LGBT plaintiff may lose. 
291. Schuler, 989 F. Supp. at 1390. 
292. See id. at 1384–89. 
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because AMEX did not realize that a lawsuit filed against the plaintiff under 
her male surname (Huminik) was a suit against her. The plaintiff argued that 
statements such as the “Schuler/Huminik affair,” “the next Huminik/Schuler 
exploit,” and the “Huminik/Schuler matter” suggested that she either had a 
multiple personality disorder or was “involved in a game of hide and seek.”293 
In response, the court held that these phrases are not false statements of facts 
and not defamatory in the context of the article.294 If, however, the Business 
Week story could have been fairly read as implying that Schuler changed her 
sex to escape recognition as the person the business world knew as Mr. 
Huminik, she arguably would have had a plausible false light action. It is one 
thing to point out that a sex change can have career advantages but something 
else to imply that a sex change was prompted by an unethical and perhaps 
pathological desire to gain those advantages.  
Finally, Schuler’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was 
rejected on the ground that there was nothing outrageous in Business Week 
magazine’s conduct.295 Furthermore, the court found Schuler’s transsexual 
status was relevant to the article—a new sex and a new name meant that some 
individuals in the business community did not know that when dealing with 
Schuler they were dealing with a person who was already known to them as 
Huminik. But there are several questions of fact the court did not give Schuler a 
chance to prove to a jury.296 These questions include whether the article 
implied that she changed her sex for success in the business world, whether 
publishing the implication was outrageous, and whether Schuler experienced 
severe emotional distress as a result of the defendant’s outrageous conduct. 
Imagine that Schuler produced evidence of a psychiatric diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria dating back to adolescence and evidence of years of therapy and 
medical treatments, culminating in surgical sex reassignment. A fact finder 
might well have concluded that was outrageous for a magazine to suggest 
blithely Schuler would have changed her sex merely to advance her career.  
D. Problems of Selective Disclosure  
In addressing wrongful publication of private fact claims, courts have not 
always grappled with the important question of what might be termed LGBT 
 
293. Id. at 1386–87. Schuler’s reference in her argument to “multiple personality disorder” 
displayed a regrettable lack of knowledge about this psychiatric condition—a condition it was 
unfair to say Business Week attributed to her. People with the rare, controversial condition 
dissociative identity disorder (“multiple personality disorder”) typically develop two or more 
distinct personalities, often in response to a serious emotional trauma. They do not typically 
surgically alter their external appearances in order to satisfy the gender identities of one of their 
personalities. See generally David H. Gleaves, Mary C. May & Etzel Cardeña, An Examination of 
the Diagnostic Validity of Dissociative Identity Disorder, 21 Clinical Psychol. Rev. 577 
(2001). 
294. Schuler, 989 F. Supp. at 1386–87.  
295. Id. at 1390.  
296. See id. at 1391–92. 
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“selective disclosure rights.” Is there a right to maintain secrecy with respect to 
sexual orientation in some contexts, despite freely disclosing sexual orientation 
in other contexts? Should there be a legal right to be “out” for some purposes 
and “in” for others? What are the psychological, social, and political 
dimensions of LGBT Americans’ need to control the flow of information about 
sexual orientation? 
These questions are implicit in cases in which courts must decide whether 
unwanted disclosure to a small group constitutes “publication.” In Borquez297 
and Greenwood v. Taft,298 employment cases, the courts answered the question 
in the affirmative. The workplace in each case was a law firm. The court in 
Borquez held that the publication private fact claim’s secrecy element could be 
satisfied by limited disclosure to a discrete segment of the public, such as 
fellow employees in a workplace.299  
In Greenwood v. Taft, plaintiff Scott Greenwood argued that the defendant 
law firm Taft, Stettinius & Hollister fired him because he was gay.300 The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.301 The appellate 
court affirmed the rejection of Mr. Greenwood’s wrongful discharge claim 
because Ohio offered no defense to LGBT people in its antidiscrimination 
law.302 However, the court reversed the dismissal of Greenwood’s publication 
of private fact claim.303 Greenwood argued that when he amended his benefits 
forms to include his male partner as the recipient of his pension, staff within the 
law firm disclosed the information to other people to whom the information 
was irrelevant.304 The court concluded that a reasonable person who has 
disclosed his sexual orientation for some employment-related purposes might 
nonetheless have been offended by being more generally “outed.”305 The court 
emphasized that the plaintiff shared the information with people to whom the 
information was irrelevant and that the information did not stay within the law 
firm, implying that the requirement of public disclosure could potentially be 
established at trial.306 However, the court ultimately held that whether the 
defendant publicly disclosed the information was a question of fact that needed 
 
297. Borquez v. Ozer, 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 940 P.2d 
371 (Colo. 1997). 
298. Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1034 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995). 
299. Borquez, 923 P.2d at 173. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the case, stating 
that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the plaintiff’s claim could be based on 
“publicity” of private fact rather than “publication.” 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997). 
300. Greenwood, 663 N.E.2d at 1034. 
301. Id. at 1031.  
302. Id. at 1032. 
303. Id. at 1036. 
304. Id. at 1034.  
305. Id. at 1035.  
306. Id. at 1035–36.  
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to be examined by the trial court.307 
Few cases better highlight the problem of selective disclosure than Sipple 
v. Chronicle Publishing,308 a case in which a bid for selective disclosure rights 
was rejected on dramatic facts. Oliver W. Sipple, a gay ex-marine, prevented 
the assassination of President Gerald Ford by foiling Sara Jane Moore’s attempt 
to shoot Mr. Ford.309 Following the incident, Sipple became a hero and 
received significant publicity.310 Subsequently, several newspapers published 
articles describing Sipple as a gay activist and as a friend of Harvey Milk,311 a 
famous gay political figure. Sipple’s heroism and military service history 
challenged the once pervasive stereotype of homosexual men as weak and 
timid. The public speculated whether the White House’s failure to display 
gratitude toward Sipple stemmed from the administration’s bias toward 
homosexuals.312  
Sipple found press reports of his homosexuality offensive and filed a 
complaint for publication of private facts.313 He argued that press reports 
exposed his sexual orientation to close relatives, his employer, and other people 
who previously did not know about it.314 As a consequence his family 
abandoned him, and Sipple suffered embarrassment and mental anguish.315  
Mr. Sipple appealed a trial court’s summary judgment order in favor of 
the defendants, who consisted of several publishers, a newspaper, and a 
columnist.316 The appellate court upheld the dismissal of Sipple’s complaint, 
finding that Sipple’s sexual orientation was not a private fact, and the 
publication was newsworthy and thus protected by the First Amendment.317 
The court stated that Sipple was a known gay figure in San Francisco who had 
marched in gay parades and who gay magazines mentioned as a close friend of 
Milk.318 Moreover, when asked about his sexual orientation, Sipple himself 
admitted that he was gay.319 Therefore, the court concluded that the articles 
disclosed a fact that was not private but already publicly known.320 In addition, 
the court held that the publication was newsworthy, and did not reveal a fact 
that met the requisite level of offensiveness.321  
 
307. Id. at 1036.  
308. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
309. Id. at 666. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 667. 
314. Id.  
315. Id.  
316. Id. 
317. Id. at 668. 
318. Id. at 669. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 669–70. 
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While Sipple’s bid for selective disclosure rights met with understandable 
failure, the failure of other LGBT plaintiffs’ bids for selective disclosure raises 
concern. In Merriwether v. Shorr, substantively a public disclosure case 
brought under New York’s commercial appropriation statute,322 a court found 
that a picture of a lesbian couple taken at their commitment ceremony and 
published years later in a magazine was newsworthy because gay couples’ 
commitment ceremonies are a reflection of the progress of society.323 Yet the 
abatement of stigma and discrimination on a societal level should not mean the 
end of individuals’ entitlement to keep their relationships out of the press.  
Plaintiffs Valerie Merriwether and Rosetta Fords, a lesbian couple, took 
part in a religious commitment ceremony in which one plaintiff was dressed in 
a bridal gown and the other a tuxedo, thereby appearing as a traditional bride 
and groom.324 Defendant Kathy Shorr was a professional photographer and also 
served as their limousine driver on the day of the ceremony.325 In the limousine 
she took the plaintiffs’ pictures with their permission.326 She asked for the 
plaintiffs’ written consent to use the photographs for commercial purposes, but 
the plaintiffs refused.327 Six years later, defendant magazine Popular 
Photography published an article on Ms. Shorr’s work, accompanied by a 
montage of her pictures, including one of the plaintiffs’ pictures with the 
caption: “LESBIAN COUPLE . . . two women on their way to a commitment 
ceremony in a church in Greenwich Village.”328 The plaintiffs filed a complaint 
claiming invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress.329 The 
plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief,330 not denying they were gay 
but arguing that they always kept their sexual orientation private and discreet. 
They also contended that they never disclosed this information to their 
coworkers, and that the publication caused them embarrassment and distress.331  
The court dismissed the privacy claim against the magazine on the ground 
that intimate homosexual ceremonies are a reflection of the progress of society 
and are thus newsworthy.332 The court rejected the couple’s emotional distress 
claim too. The court stated that the defendants’ conduct did not reach the level 
 
322. The plaintiffs availed themselves of the only privacy right New York embraces, the 
right codified in Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 
50, 51 (McKinney 1994) (liability for nonconsensual use of a person’s name or likeness for 
business or trade purposes).  
323. Merriwether v. Shorr, No. 116582/94, 1995 WL 461265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb 6, 1995). 
324. Id. at *1. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. 
331. Id. at *2.  
332. Id. 
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of outrage required for establishing this tort.333 According to the court, the 
picture did not present the plaintiffs in a sensational manner or make the gay 
wedding event appear foolish.334 Furthermore, the wedding was held in a public 
venue and the festivities took place in several locations.335 In reaching these 
conclusions about public and private, the court ignored the potential relevance 
of the vast size and effective anonymity of New York City and the couple’s 
likely knowledge of how to avoid “running into” workplace colleagues. 
The dismissal of the privacy and emotional distress claims ignored the 
importance to a gay couple of controlling the flow of information regarding 
sexual orientation from limited groups to the broad public.336 The dismissal 
entails a rejection of selective disclosure rights, and even more, reflects a policy 
of subordinating the personal desire of LGBT individuals for privacy to the 
public need for keeping pace with LGBT lifestyles.  
Many LGBT Americans have sought to live lives in which their sex, 
sexuality, or sexual orientation remains undisclosed in some social networks—
perhaps those including parents or coworkers—but is disclosed in other social 
spheres. Yet appellate courts often take what might be called a simplistic “once 
out, always out” point of view.337 If tort doctrine currently demands this point 
of view, the doctrine and the tort require rethinking and redesign to 
accommodate the reasonable privacy preferences of some member of the 
LGBT population. 
IV 
FALSE LIGHT IN THE PUBLIC EYE 
The false light tort is among the four recognized in Prosser’s 1960 article 
and later incorporated into the Second Restatement of Torts under his 
influence.338 The cause of action serves to vindicate interests in both mental 
 
333. Id. at *3.  
334. Id. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co.,  201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that Sipple’s sexual orientation was not a private fact because he was a known gay figure 
in San Francisco) cf. Merriwether v. Shorr, No. 116582/94, 1995 WL 461265, at *2  (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Feb. 6, 1995) (“plaintiffs do not deny being lesbians, but contend that they have ‘always been 
extremely private and discreet about their long-standing relationship. . . .’ [T]hey never told any of 
their co-workers of the nature of their relationship. . .”); Prince v. Out Publ‘g, No. B140475, 2002 
WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the article disclosed to a 
large number of people that he was gay, information that he had shared previously with only 
certain family members and close friends, because the article was newsworthy). 
338. Prosser, supra note 10, at 398. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: 
§ 652E. Publicity Placing Person in False Light 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the 
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if 
the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of 
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. 
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repose and reputation. According to Prosser, the roots of the “false light in the 
public eye” tort were deep in the ground before the Warren and Brandeis 
article.339 Prosser traced the origins of this tort to an 1816 suit brought by the 
poet Lord Byron “enjoining the circulation of a spurious and inferior poem 
attributed to his pen.”340 Prosser identified three categories of false light in the 
public eye cases: (1) inaccurate attribution cases (like Byron’s); (2) misleading 
use of photographs cases; and (3) imputation of criminality cases.341 Prosser 
wrote that “[t]he false light cases obviously differ from those of intrusion, or 
disclosure of private facts” in that the interest protected is reputation as in 
defamation.342 But as previously emphasized, plaintiffs alleging invasion of 
privacy after 1960 also commonly allege two or more of Prosser’s torts. The 
contemporary false light case—whether involving inaccurate attribution, 
misleading photographs, and/or implied immorality or criminality—is also 
likely to be an intrusion case, and/or a disclosure of private fact case. For 
example, LGBT plaintiffs or plaintiffs claiming not to be LGBT who bring 
suits alleging false light commonly also allege intrusion, publication of private 
facts, and even appropriation claims. If false light is normatively akin to 
defamation, then defamation is normatively akin to the invasion of privacy tort 
generally.  
A. False Light: Misattribution of Sexual Orientation  
In several cases alleging false light, the plaintiffs argued that they were 
not gay, lesbian, or transgender but were falsely portrayed as such and sought 
recovery. In D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake School, the parents of a high school boy 
filed an action against his secondary school. The school allegedly allowed or 
assisted students and the school newspaper to depict falsely the youth as gay 
and to belittle him as a “faggot.”343 In another case, Langford v. Sessions, a 
man’s photograph was used in a flier that promoted a gay club and portrayed 
him as gay.344 In Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., a heterosexual woman 
alleged that nude photographs of her posing with another woman published in 
Hustler Magazine falsely portrayed her as a lesbian.345 In Geissler v. Petrocelli, 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977). 
339. Prosser, supra note 10, at 398.  
340. Id. 
341. See id. at 399 nn.140 & 143; Martin v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1956) (“Man Hungry” woman); Semler v. Ultem Publ’ns, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. City Ct. 
1938). 
342. Prosser, supra note 10, at 400.  
343. D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (defendant 
school’s motion to compel arbitration reversed). 
344. Langford v. Sessions, No. 03-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2005), 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2003cv0255-17. 
345. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985) (reversing a 
large judgment in favor of plaintiff, reasoning that “Hustler is a magazine for men. Few men are 
interested in lesbians. The purpose of showing two women in an apparent sexual embrace is to 
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a woman claimed a book authored by former colleague falsely depicted her as 
transgender.346 Finally, in Tina Thompson v. John Doe, a female “exotic 
dancer” filed a false light claim against a male entertainer known as “Shawty 
Shawty” who frequented Pleasers, the Atlanta club at which she worked.347 
Shawty Shawty posted on his Twitter account: “Pass this on. There is a nigga 
dancing at Pleasures. His name is Nairobi and it looks female. Ass and titties 
and pussy! Be careful!”348 
The false light tort does not require proof on the part of plaintiffs that a 
defendant has published an untruth. It requires that defendant has published 
words or images that depict the plaintiff in a false or misleading light. Plaintiffs 
need not be prepared to characterize defendants as liars. However, courts 
struggle with how to distinguish false light actions from defamation actions.349 
Some courts will dismiss false light actions if the plaintiff’s claim is that 
attributions of LGBT status are flatly untrue. Thus in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley 
College, the court found that a state school system employee condemned by a 
college Vice President as incompetent and a “fag” would have to seek recovery 
through a defamation claim.350 In Albright v. Morton, a straight man alleged 
privacy invasion following publication of a book in which a gay man’s 
photograph appeared alongside a caption bearing his name.351 Plaintiffs James 
Albright, a former bodyguard and the ex-lover of the pop star Madonna, and his 
ex-employer Amrak Productions sued defendants Andrew Morton, Michael 
O’Mara Books, St. Martin’s Press, and Newsgroup Newspapers for allegedly 
falsely portraying Albright as a homosexual in their book.352 The court held 
that Albright’s false light claim was actually a defamation claim because “he 
objects to the making of a false statement, not the revelation of private 
information.”353 Albright was an especially far-fetched, even silly false light 
claim litigated by a straight man.354 However, the Massachusetts court took 
 
display the charms of two women.”); cf. Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980) (holding that a false attribution of homosexuality is “slander per se” in a case where flight 
attendant sued fellow employee for slander, invasion of privacy, battery and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress after she falsely represented to others that the plaintiff was a lesbian).  
346. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980). 
347. Complaint for Thompson, supra note 53, at 3–4.  
348. Id. at 4. 
349. Cf. Jews for Jesus, Inc., v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098, 1114 (Fla.2008) (declining to 
recognize a claim for false light invasion of privacy separate from defamation). 
350. Nazeri v. Missouri Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. 1993). 
351. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004). 
352. Id. at 132–33.  
353. Id. at 140.  
354. See id. at 136. The court also rejected the false light claim because the tort was not 
recognized in Massachusetts. Id. at 140. Albright asked the court to recognize the false light claim, 
and the court held that it was not essential to recognize the tort for this case. Id. In Massachusetts 
there was a cause of action for invasion of privacy, but in this case all the information in the book 
was delivered with the permission of Albright, so there was no invasion of privacy. Id. The court 
rejected all the other claims. See id. at 133. 
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advantage of the case as an opportunity to advance large claims about the 
modern significance of stating that a person is a homosexual: it can be 
defamatory to assert falsely that someone is homosexual, but it is no longer 
inherently highly offensive or defamatory per se to assert that someone is a 
homosexual.  
The defendants purchased from Albright the rights to publish information 
about his romantic relationship with Madonna, and later published it in an 
internationally distributed book.355 The book contained a picture of Madonna 
walking beside her ex-employee, Jose Guitierez.356 Guitierez was outspoken 
about his sexual orientation and represented “his homosexual ideology in what 
many would refer to as sometimes graphic and offensive detail.”357 According 
to the complaint, Guitierez was well known because he appeared in a 
documentary about Madonna, and performed on stage with her.358 The caption 
accompanying the picture of Guitierez read “Jim Albright (with Madonna in 
1993) told Morton he felt ‘overwhelming love’ for her.”359 Albright in turn 
argued that the picture portrayed him as gay.360  
The plaintiffs filed a complaint for defamation, among other claims, but 
the court held that the photograph contained nothing to imply that Albright was 
gay.361 Furthermore, the book described Albright as having had a long 
heterosexual relationship with Madonna.362 The court also stated that, even if 
the picture implied that Albright was gay, to identify someone as gay is not a 
defamatory act per se and such a holding would “legitimize relegating 
homosexuals to second-class status.”363 The court discussed several 
developments in law, including the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 
decision in favor of same-sex marriage, as indicating that the law cannot 
support a discriminatory view of gays. 
B. Misattribution of Lifestyle or Character 
Sometimes LGBT individuals resort to the privacy tort, not to complain 
that someone has revealed their sexual orientation, but that someone has 
distorted or degraded their characters in way connected to their sexual 
orientation. Andrea Dworkin’s false light claim against Hustler Magazine can 
be understood in this light.364 In another case, a former employee sued Sun 
Microsystems alleging that his supervisor depicted him in a false light by 
 
355. Id.  
356. Id.  
357. Id.  
358. Id. at 133–34.  
359. Id. at 133.  
360. Id. at 134. 
361. Id. at 136.  
362. Id. at 136.  
363. Id. at 138.  
364. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989). 
allenCLRfinalNoPagination.doc (Do Not Delete) 12/1/2010  4:33 PM 
142 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  XX:nnn 
telling others he had “hit on” coworkers, turning him into a perpetrator of 
sexual harassment.365 The Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos.366 court, as discussed 
earlier, rejected the false light claim of a transgender businesswoman who 
argued that the article implied she “changed her sex in order to conceal an SEC 
filing rather than to cure her gender dysphoria syndrome.”367 The court held 
that the article “raise[d] the legitimate issue of whether Plaintiff’s sex change 
worked to her advantage by concealing part of her past.”368 The court stated 
that a false light claim required proof of a false statement of fact, which in this 
case the plaintiff did not establish.369 Schuler also did not prove that the article 
placed her under false light.370  
In Whitaker v. A&E Television Networks, defendant-appellant A&E 
Television Networks broadcasted a picture of the plaintiff in its documentary, 
“The History of Sex,” that suggested the plaintiff was gay, HIV-positive, and a 
drug user.371 According to the court,  
The narrator state[d]: “AIDS had exacted a deadly toll on gay men 
and [intravenous] drug users as well as hundreds of thousands of 
heterosexuals in Africa and Haiti. But it wasn’t publicly 
acknowledged by [President] Ronald Reagan until well after Rock 
Hudson died of the disease in 1985. . . .” Just before the narrator 
[stated] “users,” the documentary shows a picture of [plaintiff-
respondent Miles] Whitaker on the street at night shaking what 
appears to be a cup and nodding at people walking by.372 
The documentary neither mentioned Whitaker’s name, nor mentioned he 
was HIV-positive, a drug user, or homosexual.373 Nonetheless the plaintiff 
argued that the documentary inaccurately portrayed him as a gay drug user 
living with HIV.374 The plaintiff filed a complaint for defamation, false light, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and he sought injunctive 
relief.375 The defendant moved to strike, arguing the causes of action arose 
from First Amendment-protected activity.376 The trial court denied the motion, 
and the defendant appealed. 
Affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court held that, while the 
 
365. Willliams v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., No. H029828, 2007 WL 2254301 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug 7, 2007) (false light claim time dismissed as barred by statute of limitations). 
366. Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F. Supp. 1377 (D.N.M. 1997). 
367. Id. at 1384–85. 
368. Id. at 1385.  
369. Id. at 1390.  
370. Id. 
371. Whitaker v. A&E Television Networks, No. G040880, 2009 WL 1383617, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. May 18, 2009). 
372. Id. at *1. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. 
376. Id.  
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subject matter of the documentary was a matter of public concern, the plaintiff 
was not a public figure, and whether he was a drug user or HIV carrier was not 
a matter of public concern.377 The defendants argued that the documentary did 
not disclose the plaintiff’s name and his appearance was brief.378 The court 
rejected this argument, stating that the relevant question was whether the 
documentary implied that the plaintiff belonged to one of the groups 
mentioned: gays, drug users, or HIV carriers.379  
C. False Light and Beyond: Privacy Invasions Excused for the Greater Good 
Individuals who have sued under any privacy tort theory alleging that 
their actions, opinions, or beliefs were portrayed in a false and misleading light 
have often lost these suits.380 In Dominick v. Index Journal Co.,381 the 
defendant newspaper, The Index Journal, published a pro-gay letter and 
attributed it to the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied writing it. The letter preached 
tolerance toward same-sex marriage, arguing against the “‘close-minded 
opinions’ of a lot of local citizens . . . towards the gay and lesbian celebrations” 
in the area, and calling for the “need to expand our horizons on prejudice.”382 
The plaintiff was gay and argued that the article exposed his “private affairs,” 
although it was not clear if he argued that his homosexual identity was exposed 
or just his view on gay marriage.383 Among the privacy torts, a false light claim 
would have been better suited to the facts, but the tort is not favored in South 
Carolina and may not be available at all.384 Dominick filed a complaint for 
negligence, libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
 
377. Id. at *3. 
378. Id. at *4.  
379. Id.  
380. In the Uranga case, the plaintiff had to abandon his false light claim because the 
publication that placed him in false light relied on a court record, and the court held that it would 
be an unreasonable burden on newspapers to verify every court document. Uranga v. Federated 
Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29 (Idaho 2003). In Prince, the court rejected a gay model’s claim that he 
was falsely portrayed as attending a type of party popular with a segment of the gay community 
because the party was a public event. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jan. 3, 2002). Furthermore, in Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., a picture of same-sex 
spouses kissing was published without their permission as part of an advertising campaign to 
which they objected. 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2006). The newspaper photographer had 
photographed the couple while they waited their turn to marry. Id. at 18. The men unsuccessfully 
argued that the publication falsely portrayed them as “unpatriotic American citizens who do not 
support the United States Military.” Id. at 22. Neither their false light nor their appropriation 
claims were sustained. Id. at 18. 
381. Dominick v. Index Journal Co., No. 99-CP-24-370, 2001 WL 1763977 (S.C. Ct. Com. 
Pl. Mar. 15, 2001). 
382. Id. at *1. 
383. Id. at *3. 
384. See Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P., 684 S.E.2d 756, 759 (S.C. 2009) 
(“In South Carolina, there are three separate and distinct causes of action for invasion of privacy: 
1) wrongful appropriation of personality; 2) wrongful publicizing of private affairs; and 3) 
wrongful intrusion into private affairs.” (citing Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 
S.E.2d 126 (1999))). 
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distress.385 The trial court granted the media defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment as to all counts except negligence.  
On appeal, the court held that Dominick failed to establish a libel claim 
because the publication did not adversely affect the plaintiff or his reputation in 
the community.386 The court also denied the publication of private fact claim 
because the plaintiff did not establish that the defendant intentionally gave 
publicity to private fact or had knowledge that adverse results were likely to 
follow.387 As to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court 
determined that the plaintiff could not establish that the defendant’s “conduct 
was so extreme or outrageous that [it] exceeded all possible bounds of 
decency.”388 Finally, the court dismissed the negligence cause of action because 
the plaintiff’s libel claim had been denied, and the court did not want the 
plaintiff to use the negligence claim to “sneak[] into the courthouse through the 
back door.”389 Since the libel claim provides some constitutional protections 
that do not exist in negligence, the court expressed concern that allowing the 
plaintiff to plead negligence would undermine the media’s First Amendment 
protection and defeat the purposes of libel law.390  
Of special interest, the court seemed unwilling to punish the media for 
publishing a letter discussing a matter of public interest. The court observed 
that the “letter discussed two major public events, one of which occurred in 
South Carolina and was the subject of two news articles in the Index Journal 
the month preceding the publication of the letter.”391 Moreover the “letter 
called for community tolerance and promoted constitutional values.”392  
In Dominick, as in other cases, the national importance of the LGBT 
population’s historic quest for equality and inclusion undercuts the practical 
utility of the invasion of privacy tort and perhaps the defamation tort as well. 
Recall the Massachusetts judge in Albright arguing that the lessening of stigma 
and discrimination in his state, which recognized same-sex marriage in 2003 in 
Goodridge, means it can no longer be considered defamatory to gossip that 
someone is a homosexual.393 In the words of another judge: “Several legal 
authorities have suggested that one’s identity as a homosexual—even though it 
 
385. Dominick, 2001 WL 1763977, at *1.  
386. Id. at *2–*3.  
387. Id. at *4. 
388. Id.  
389. Id. at *5.  
390. Id. 
391. Id. at *4. 
392. Id. 
393. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136 (D. Mass. 2004) (“I could not find that 
such a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning. . . . [I]n this day and age, I cannot conclude 
that identifying someone as a homosexual discredits him, that the statement fits within the 
category of defamation per se.”). The Albright court argued that in the wake of Lawrence v. Texas 
accusations of homosexuality no longer imply criminality and that describing someone as a 
homosexual is no longer properly viewed as defamatory per se. Id. at 137. 
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is in essence a private matter—is inherently a matter of public concern because 
it ‘necessarily and ineluctably’ involves that person in the ongoing public 
debate regarding the rights of homosexuals.”394 In Prince, the gay model lost 
on his privacy claims against Out magazine because photographs of him 
selected for the magazine had been taken in a “public place” and illustrated a 
newsworthy public health story.395 It did not seem to matter to the court that the 
model whose photographs Out had appropriated had not yet come out to his 
family and did not live the reckless life of excessive illegal drug use and 
unprotected sex described in the article.396 Although information about sexual 
orientation can be highly sensitive, courts have deemed the conduct and 
experiences of members of the LGBT population broadly “public,” 
“newsworthy,” and “of legitimate public concern” even when individual 
members of the group have not.397  
V 
APPROPRIATION 
A plaintiff’s prima face case of appropriation will typically allege a 
nonconsensual use of the name, moniker, or photographic likeness of the 
plaintiff in an advertisement or in connection with a business or commercial 
product such as a book, magazine, newspaper, or film. The first state court to 
recognize the existence of a freestanding invasion of privacy cause of action 
did so in the context of an “appropriation” case.398  
Prosser identified “appropriation” as among the four extant privacy torts 
and included it in his formulation of the tort for the Second Restatement.399 
Prosser did not think commercially appropriating attributes of personal identity, 
intrusion upon seclusion, or false light were the kind of offenses Warren and 
Brandeis had in mind for their new tort action to address, and he seems to have 
been correct.400 But common law courts citing Warren and Brandeis 
nonetheless came to regard these offenses, along with publication of private 
 
394. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp.2d 1279, 1284 (D. Utah 1998) (citing Rowland 
v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1012 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari)). The court went on to conclude: “Thus, it could be said that a voluntary ‘coming out’ 
or an involuntary ‘outing’ of a gay, lesbian or bisexual teacher would always be a matter of public 
concern.” Id. 
395. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999, at *9. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 
2002). 
396. Id. at *7–*8. 
397. I refer to Sipple, Uranga, Prince, Cinel and other individuals extensively discussed 
herein.  
398. Pavesich v New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68 (Ga. 1905). 
399. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977) (“One who 
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy.”). 
400. See Prosser, supra note 10, at 401.  
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fact, as actionable “invasions of privacy.”401 Upon reflection, it should not be 
surprising that courts would regard using a person’s name, picture, or likeness 
in circulated materials as a wrong in the same general category of tort as prying 
into that same person’s private life or publishing the details of her private life. 
Commercial appropriation and publication of private fact are both ways of 
paying attention and calling attention to someone who might prefer to be let 
alone.  
A. Appropriation Tort Winners 
Appropriation claims by those portrayed as homosexual are occasionally 
successful, as in Langford v. Sessions.402 Plaintiff Marcus Langford was an 
amateur bodybuilder who alleged that the defendants, a nightclub and flier-
design company, impermissibly used his photograph on a flier to promote a gay 
party.403 The flier was also posted on a website.404 Langford argued that the 
flier wrongfully portrayed him as gay, and as a result, he allegedly suffered 
emotional damage. Based on his religious background and beliefs, a gay 
lifestyle was intolerable.405 He argued that since the publication, more gays 
approached him in the gym, and he had to explain to friends that he was not 
gay.406 He also contended that after the flier was distributed, the website 
Gay.com started using his photograph as a profile picture.407 In addition to 
punitive damages, Langford filed a complaint for misappropriation, false light, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and defamation.408 The 
court found Langford entitled to compensatory damages for counts of 
misappropriation, false light, and negligence and awarded him $70,000.409  
The court found that the defendants appropriated Langford’s photograph 
for their benefit.410 This holding is consistent with Prosser’s description of the 
appropriation tort as effective for plaintiffs who show that a defendant has 
pirated the plaintiff’s identity for some advantage of his own.411 The Langford 
court also held that the use of the photograph placed the plaintiff in false light 
because it portrayed him as something he was not, and he had a right to portray 
 
401. See, e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 74 (citing Warren and Brandeis). 
402. See Langford v. Sessions, No. 03-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2005), 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2003cv0255-17. But see Douglass v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985); Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, 
Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2006). 
403. Langford, No. 03-255 (CKK), at 1. 
404. Id. at 1.  
405. Id. at 4–6.  
406. Id. at 5.  
407. Id. at 4.  
408. Id. at 1. 
409. Id. at 15. 
410. Id. at 10.  
411. Prosser, supra note 10, at 403. 
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himself in that context in a manner of his choosing.412 The court thus found the 
defendant liable for negligence because reasonable care would have included 
asking for the plaintiff’s permission to use his photograph.413 
The court rejected Langford’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim because he had not shown he asked the defendants to stop using the 
photograph.414 In addition, the defendants’ conduct was not so extreme and the 
plaintiff did not prove he suffered emotional damage “so acute a nature that 
harmful physical consequences might be not unlikely to result.”415 The court 
also dismissed the claim for punitive damages, finding that the defendants’ 
conduct was not outrageous and that they did not act in malice, did not risk 
harm to others, did not physically or economically harm the plaintiff, and did 
not repeat the tortious act.416 Rejecting the claim for defamation, the court held 
that the plaintiff did not prove that claiming someone is homosexual is a 
defamatory act.417  
Albright v. Morton, cited by the Langford court to support the notion that 
“an allegation of homosexuality is defamatory does not have an initial 
plausibility or appeal,”418 rejected an appropriation claim brought by 
Madonna’s ex-bodyguard and lover.419 In Albright the court stated that for 
plaintiffs to prevail in an appropriation case, they need to prove that the 
appropriation’s purpose is to take advantage of their reputation or prestige.420 
The court held that, even though the defendant used Albright’s picture to sell 
more books, since the picture was also published in a newspaper article, it did 
not use the reputation of Albright or make commercial use of Albright’s 
name.421 
B. Appropriation Losers 
As in Albright, appropriation claims by those wrongly portrayed as 
homosexual are sometimes unsuccessful. Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 
is another, less palatable, example.422 In Raymen, a newspaper photographer 
shot a picture of the plaintiffs, a same-sex couple, kissing while waiting their 
turn to marry.423 The photograph was published in the newspaper and on its 
 
412. Langford, No. 03-255 (CKK), at 10. 
413. Id. at 11–12.  
414. Id. at 10–11.  
415. Id. at 11 (citing Kitt v. Capital Concerts, Inc., 742 A.2d 856, 862 (D.C. 1999)).  
416. Id. at 14.  
417. Id. at 13.  
418. Id. at 13 n.6 (citing Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 139 (D. Mass. 2004)). 
419. Albright, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 at 139 (D. Mass. 2004).  
420. Id. at 139–40. 
421. Id. 
422. 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2006). In Albright the alleged appropriation was in 
a detergent publication glitch, whereas in Raymen the use of the plaintiffs’ photographs was 
intentional and for political gain unrelated to the beliefs and values of the plaintiffs. Id. at 18. 
423. Id. 
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website and later used without permission as part of an advertisement for a 
nonprofit organization, United Senior Association (USA Next).424 USA Next 
challenged the positions taken by the American Association of Retired Persons 
(AARP).425 The advertisement contained two pictures: one of the plaintiffs 
kissing with a green checkmark over it and a second picture of an American 
soldier, presumably in Iraq, with a red X over it.426 Under the photograph there 
was a caption: “The Real AARP Agenda,” suggesting that AARP opposes the 
United States’ wars abroad and supports gay lifestyle.427 The plaintiffs argued 
that the advertisement portrayed them as against American troops and 
unpatriotic.428 They allegedly suffered embarrassment and extreme emotional 
distress in consequence and filed a complaint for libel, false light, appropriation 
of their likeness, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.429  
The court rejected the men’s appropriation claim, stating that the 
advertisement was non-commercial.430 The photograph had been used by a 
nonprofit organization and was not for commercial use.431 The court then 
characterized the publication as newsworthy and thus protected by the First 
Amendment.432 The court held that the campaign used the photograph to 
address matters of legitimate public concern—same-sex marriage and support 
for the military.433 The court also dismissed libel, false light, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims.434 
In Prince, the court held that the misappropriation claim was not 
actionable because the photograph accompanied an article on a gay lifestyle 
that was an “element of popular culture,” and thus newsworthy.435 The 
contention that a matter is newsworthy merely because it relates to the 
amorphous beast “popular culture” threatens to gut the right to privacy entirely.  
VI 
 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 19. 
426. Id. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. at 19–20. 
430. Id. at 20.  
431. Id. 
432. Id. at 23.  
433. Id. at 25.  
434. The court dismissed all claims, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish libel 
because the advertisement was not defamatory and a reasonable person could not interpret the 
advertisement as stating that the plaintiffs were unpatriotic. Id. at 21–22. The court similarly 
dismissed the couple’s false light claim on the ground that there was no reasonable link between 
the advertisement and the pictured men’s belief system. Id. at 25. The kissers’ intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim was denied because the defendant’s conduct was not so 
outrageous in character as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Id. at 29–30. 
435. Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999, at *10. (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 
2002).  
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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Prosser was skeptical of the privacy tort. He feared the tort—the four 
torts—would be overly generous to plaintiffs with trivial or self-inflicted 
wounds.436 He also feared the tort would be duplicative of other actions with 
the same gist: “Taking intrusion [e.g.], the gist of the wrong is clearly the 
intentional infliction of mental distress, which is now in itself a recognized 
basis of tort liability.”437 He could not have known that fifty years later lawyers 
would survey the privacy tort case law and find duplication (1) among the four 
privacy torts; and (2) between the privacy torts and defamation, and the privacy 
torts and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and—not examined here—
between the privacy torts and the right to publicity438 and confidentiality.439 
The privacy torts have been additive and duplicative, but not in ways that 
appear to have made a difference in the justice of outcomes.  
There may be duplication and even cannibalization, but LGBT cases 
suggest that the invasion of privacy tort and the infliction of emotional distress 
torts function more as friends than competitors. The intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort commonly accompanies the invasion of privacy torts in 
lawsuits alleging wrongs of intrusion, publicity, and appropriation, with the 
latter two more or less standing or falling together. In Simpson, for example, 
the court held that the sending of threatening and intimidating letters to a 
lesbian couple invaded privacy and caused extreme emotional distress, driving 
them to sell their newly acquired restaurant business and leave town.440 The 
repetition of the letters and the death threats supported the emotional distress 
claim.441 Meanwhile, the act of publicizing the plaintiff’s sexual orientation in 
disparaging letters mailed to the community supported a privacy invasion 
claim.442 The court acknowledged that the defendants had the right to believe 
that homosexuality “is at odds with the teachings of the bible,” but it found that 
the defendants’ behavior “constituted an extraordinary transgression of the 
bounds of socially tolerable conduct” and enjoyed no immunity.443  
However, in many other cases, the plaintiffs’ emotional distress did not 
make the grade.444 Courts in these cases have ruled that wrongdoings did not 
 
436. Prosser, supra note 10, at 422. 
437. Id.  
438. Cf. Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“California has long recognized a common law right of privacy for protection of a person’s name 
and likeness against appropriation by others for their advantage.”).  
439. See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering 
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123 (2007). 
440. Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1131 (D. Or. 2000). 
441. Id. at 1124. 
442. Id. at 1125.  
443. Id. at 1123–24. 
444. Courts ruling this way include Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 
15 (D.D.C. 2006); Langford v. Sessions, No. 03-255 (CKK) (D.D.C. July 29, 2005), 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2003cv0255-17; Albright v. Morton, 321 F. 
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amount to extreme and outrageous conduct, which is either intentional or 
reckless and which causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.  
Templeton is a good illustration of privacy and emotional distress claims 
meeting the same doomed fate.445 Plaintiff Doe and a friend permitted the 
defendant Templeton, a professional skateboarder, to take their photograph, 
after he had misrepresented himself as world-renowned professional 
skateboarder Tony Hawk.446 Defendant Toy Machine used the photograph to 
advertise a videotape describing the company’s skateboard team.447 The 
advertisement, with the plaintiff’s picture, instructed those who wanted the 
videotape to “[w]rite to: I am gay in a happy way not a sexual one” at a specific 
address.448 Doe, who was gay, argued that the advertisement drew attention to 
and disclosed her sexual identity.449 She filed a complaint for violation of the 
Illinois Right of Publicity Act, publication of private facts, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and negligence.450 The plaintiff, who worked as a 
teacher, had to discuss the advertisement with her employer, but did not expose 
her sexual orientation during the conversation.451  
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the 
counts of publication of private facts and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. As to the publication of private facts count, the court held that the 
plaintiff did not establish the necessary elements of the tort because the 
advertisement did not disclose that she was gay but at most “disclosed what 
plaintiff looked like on that particular day in June 2002,” and the defendants 
did not know that plaintiff was gay and therefore could not intentionally reveal 
any private fact.452 In so holding, the court stated for the record that a plaintiff’s 
sexual orientation is not a legitimate public concern, and its disclosure could be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person in an appropriate case.453  
For similar reasons, the court also denied the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim. For one, the defendants’ behavior was not extreme or 
outrageous.454 Second, they did not intend to cause emotional distress to the 
plaintiff, as they did not know about the plaintiff’s sexual identity.455 Third, the 
 
Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004); Doe v. Templeton, No. 03 C 5076, 2004 WL 1882436 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 6, 2004); Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 31 (Idaho 2003); Madsen v. 
Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985); Merriwether v. Shorr, No. 116582/94, 1995 WL 461265 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb 6, 1995); and Dominick v. Index Journal Co., No. 99-CP-24-370, 2001 WL 
1763977 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 15, 2001). 
445. Templeton, 2004 WL 1882436. 
446. Id. at *1.  
447. Id.  
448. Id.  
449. Id.  
450. Id.  
451. Id.  
452. Id. at *3.  
453. Id.  
454. Id. at *5. 
455. Id.  
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plaintiff failed to introduce compelling evidence to demonstrate severe 
emotional distress. Her claims of stress, weight loss, and eczema were 
insufficient.456 The claim for punitive damages was denied because the plaintiff 
did not establish that the defendants’ conduct was “similar to that found in a 
crime.”457 Jane Doe’s privacy and emotional distress actions thus stood and fell 
together. 
CONCLUSION 
Although there have been victories worth mention, the invasion of privacy 
tort has not proven especially useful to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
plaintiffs. Despite the apparent limited success by LGBT plaintiffs in the cases 
examined here, one must acknowledge the theoretical possibility that the 
invasion of privacy tort has been a powerful deterrent to privacy invasions 
targeting the LGBT population. It is also possible that many invasion of 
privacy suits have been filed and either successfully settled out of court or 
litigated and won without appeal. Nonetheless, published appellate court 
opinions paint a troubling picture, suggesting that privacy tort litigation may 
not be worth the bother.  
American society seems to be moving toward a more socially tolerant 
future. One day, sexual orientation and sex change will cease to warrant special 
notice. People will stop threatening, mocking, and discriminating. Although we 
are not there yet, some courts have prematurely declared that LGBT persons 
have achieved sufficient equality—that what is whispered in the closets can 
now be shouted from the rooftops.458 That to be known as queers or fags or 
simply as LGBT is no longer to be vulnerable or despised. Courts deciding 
whether a privacy claim should withstand summary judgment, a motion to 
dismiss, or an appeal should be cautious in adopting what may be overly 
expansive, optimistic assumptions about what is appropriately privileged, 
public, and newsworthy. I make this point not to cling to the false security of 
the closet on behalf of LGBT Americans or to encourage hypersensitivity about 
their orientation, identity and relationships, but firmly to decline the invitation 
to assume an inherent lack of merit or wisdom in privacy-seeking in everyday 
life after Lawrence and Goodridge. 
The enduring legacy of Prosser’s article is beyond dispute. However, 
several questions must be asked. First, did Prosser acknowledge all of the 
categories and subcategories of “privacy” torts?459 The LGBT cases suggest 
 
456. Id.  
457. Id.  
458. See Luke 12:3 (King James) (“Therefore whatsoever ye have spoken in darkness shall 
be heard in the light; and that which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed upon 
the housetops.”); cf. Matthew 10:27 (King James) (“What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in 
light: and what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops.”). 
459. Some critics have suggested that Prosser failed to include a fifth privacy tort, “breach 
of confidentiality.” See, e.g., Richards & Solove, supra note 439, at 125. 
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that Prosser missed or oversimplified cases or categories that ought to have 
been included in his purportedly comprehensive analysis of privacy case law. 
Second, did Prosser exaggerate the distinctiveness with which his four torts 
were imminent in the case law? Edward Bloustein famously argued that the 
four privacy torts have an important commonality: the concept of dignity.460 In 
fairness, Prosser neither affirms nor denies that there is a common value that 
justifies recognition of all four invasions of privacy torts. Yet stressing, as he 
did, the severability of the tort into four discrete categories can obscure the 
unifying fact that defendants have affronted plaintiffs in a way that leaves 
plaintiffs feeling—to borrow an image from the Georgia opinion Pavesich v. 
New England Life Insurance—like slaves to a merciless master.461 
The cases examined reveal that a gap has developed between the 
formalities of pleading that can be credited to Prosser’s enormous influence, 
and the actual experiences of LGBT plaintiffs. LGBT plaintiffs often allege in 
their complaints that a single injurious episode has given rise to multiple 
privacy causes of action. Indeed, LGBT plaintiffs often allege, as a formal 
matter, that defendants in a single action violated two, three, or all four of 
Prosser’s privacy sub-torts, plus the defamation and emotional distress torts.462 
This allegation of multiple torts is an undisputable fact about pleading, a 
function of responsible lawyering within the taxonomic framework of the 
positive law Prosser shaped. But as Prosser’s critics note, the four torts have in 
common a singular normative foundation of respect for human dignity and 
inviolate personhood.463 Thus, while LGBT plaintiffs typically allege that a 
single wrongful encounter with disrespectful defendants has affronted their 
basic desire to be left alone, their attorneys formally divide these encounters 
into multiple causes of action. People want to be let alone; leave it to lawyers 
and analytic philosophers to tell them they want to be let alone in four or more 
distinguishable senses. 
In principle, LGBT individuals, like everyone else, can recover for highly 
offensive wrongful acts of intrusion, publication, or appropriation. But on the 
 
460. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 971 (1964). 
461. Pavesich v New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905) (“[H]e is in reality a 
slave without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master . . . .”). 
462. See, e.g., Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F. Supp. 1377 (D.N.M. 1997) 
(transgender woman alleged that publication of a magazine article critical of her constituted 
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light, publication of private facts and 
intrusion); Prince v. Out Publ’g, No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002) (gay 
man alleged that publication of his photographs without consent constituted both libel and 
invasion of all four privacy torts); Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984) (gay ex-marine whose sexual orientation was publicized in the press after he thwarted 
assassination of President Ford alleged intrusion, publication of private facts, false light, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985) 
(lesbian fired from job at Christian Science Monitor alleged defamation, intrusion, publication of 
private facts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
463. See generally Bloustein, supra note 460. 
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evidence of the tort cases cited in this Article, I reluctantly conclude that 
recovery for invasion of privacy is unlikely where the “reasonable person” and 
the “reasonable LGBT” person part ways. What is offensive to LGBT persons 
struggling for liberty, equality, dignity, and intimacy is not always offensive to 
the judiciary’s hypothetical everyman. Homosexuality, gender unorthodoxy, 
and sex change were once considered morally illicit, dangerous, and potentially 
criminal. Secrecy and selective self-disclosure are needs that arose in a time of 
intolerance and discrimination. As long as intolerance and discrimination 
against LGBT individuals remain, the need for seclusion, secrecy, and selective 
self-disclosure will remain as well.464  
 
464. Sadly, the intimate lives of LGBT Americans are still subject to unwarranted invasion.  
On September 22, 2010, Rutgers University freshman Tyler Clementi committed suicide after his 
roommate and another student used hidden webcams to stream over the internet live images of 
Clementi having sex with a male partner in a supposedly private dorm room.  
